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Case Comments
Constitutional Law: College Regulations Employed
In Suspension of Student Demonstrators Upheld
Appellant college students were suspended for two semesters
by college officials for involvement in unruly and disruptive
demonstrations against the college administration in which col-
lege property was destroyed. Esteban arrived at the scene of the
first demonstration as it subsided and refused to leave at the
request of a college official. Later, he swore at college officials
and threatened injury to a resident assistant. Roberds was
part of the crowd on both evenings and talked to others about
the events that were occurring but did not perform any of the
violent acts. After the suspensions appellants filed complaints
demanding injunctive relief and reinstatement, but were denied
both.' After written charges and notice had been given both,
the suspensions were upheld by the federal district court.2 The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,3 holding that the ad-
ministration could find that both had been participants in the
demonstrations, that the college regulations used in suspending
them were not void for vagueness and that the petitioners' first
amendment rights had not been violated. Esteban v. Central
Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 965 (1970).
First amendment rights were first judicially recognized in
the academic environment in 1923 when the United States Su-
preme Court held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment prevents states from prohibiting the teaching of for-
1. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D.
Mo. 1967). The district court initially found that there was uncertainty
as to the grounds upon which disciplinary action was to be taken and
that neither Esteban nor Roberds had been given the opportunity to
present their versions of the case. New hearings were granted to both.
Both were allowed written statements of the charges, a hearing before
the president of the college, inspection of affidavits which the college in-
tended to submit at the hearing, the right to present their case through
affidavits and witnesses, the right to counsel, the right to question wit-
nesses giving evidence against them, the right to make records of the
events, and the right to have the president's findings in writing as to the
disciplinary action taken against them. Id. at 651-52.
2. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622 (W.D.
Mo. 1968).
3. Jurisdiction in the federal courts was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1343
(3) & 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
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eign languages to students.4 Not until West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette5 in 1943, however, did students who were
subjected to adverse regulations or discipline seek judicial relief.
Since Barnette, many cases involving academic discipline have
come to the courts-most in the wake of Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education,6 the pathbreaking decision which stated
that students at public institutions of higher learning do have
certain constitutional rights that the courts will recognize and
protect. Prior to Dixon, the greatest obstacle to judicial review7
of alleged violations under the fourteenth amendment was the
argument that school attendance was merely a revocable privi-
lege.8 Courts took the position that students had no "rights"
deserving of protection by the courts from unreasonable treat-
ment.9 A student's interest in receiving an education was seen
as a mere privilege so that the only rights of the student capable
of enforcement were those provided by statute or the student's
contract with the university.10 A second impediment to review
was the need to establish that the state had sufficient contacts
with the academic institution to bring the latter's action under
4. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v Iowa, 262
U.S. 404 (1923). For the law in this area see Note, Reasonable Rules,
Reasonably Enforced-Guidelines for University Disciplinary Proceeding,
53 INN. L. Rzv. 301 (1968); Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward
Student Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. R v. 290 (1968). For a com-
plete setting and critique of the present law see Wright, The Constitu-
tion on the Campus, 22 VA=x. L. REv. 1027 (1969).
5. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The Court held that under the first
amendment, students in public schools could not be compelled to salute
the flag nor be suspended for failure to do so.
6. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
7. Historically, courts used two other theories to refrain from
intervening in academic affairs. The proposition that the school stands
in loco parentis emphasized that the school takes the place of the parents,
and thus makes rules for the students as the parents could make. See
Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913). The con-
tractual theory emphasized that upon enrollment, the student became
bound by the terms and conditions found in college publications and
thus broad discretionary powers were reserved to the college. See De-
haan v. Brandeis Univ., 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass. 1957). Both of these
theories have been discredited at the college level. See Moore v. Stu-
dent Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D.
Ala. 1968).
8. See Note, supra note 4, at 303.
9. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934);
Steier v. New York State Educ. Conm'r, 271 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1959).
10. Goldstein v. New York Univ., 76 App. Div. 80, 83, 78 N.Y.S.
739, 740 (1902). See also John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510,
102 So. 637 (1924); Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156
Mich. 95, 120 N.W. 589 (1909); Frank v. Marquette Univ., 209 Wis. 372,
245 N.W. 125 (1932).
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the "state action" requirement of the fourteenth amendment."
Beginning with Dixon, courts officially recognized the im-
portance of higher education to students12 and the need for
procedural due process in schools prior to expulsion or disci-
plinary action. Dixon held that college officials must at least
exercise "the fundamental principles of fairness by giving the
accused students notice of the charges and an opportunity to be
heard in their own defense. 1' 3  Although focusing on procedural
due process, the Dixon court also opened the door to review of
substantive due process issues14 -- the reasonableness of school
regulations, 15 the reasonableness or arbitrariness in the applica-
tion of these regulations' 6 and the harshness of penalties imposed
when a regulation is violated.
With the emergence of civil rights demonstrations and col-
lege activism, students and protesters have begun to attack the
constitutionality of various campus regulations,'7 particularly
11. In the case of land grant colleges administered and supported
by the state, "state action" theories pose no problem. For theories deal-
ing with private institutions see Note, supra note 4, at 305.
12. The court of appeals in Dixon stated:
It is not enough to say, as did the district court in the present
case, "The right to attend a public college or university is not
in and of itself a constitutional right.".
The precise nature of the private interest involved in this
case is the right to remain at a public institution of higher learn-
ing in which the plaintiffs were students in good standing.
294 F.2d at 156-57.
13. Id. at 157. At least one court, although later reversed, has gone
so far as to say that various trial type hearing requirements are also
necessary in high school suspensions. The court stated that the need for
procedural fairness when dealing with juveniles in public schools is as
great as the need for fairness in dealing with similar disciplinary action
at the college level. Madera v. Board of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.
N.Y.), rev'd, 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028
(1968).
14. 294 F.2d at 157 where the court stated:
Admittedly, there must be some reasonable and constitutional
ground for expulsion or the courts would have a duty to require
reinstatement. The possibility of arbitrary action is not ex-
cluded by the existence of reasonable regulations.
15. See, e.g., Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966);
Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Hammond v.
South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967); Gold-
berg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463
(1st D. Ct. App. 1967).
16. See, e.g., Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280, 287 (D. Colo.
1968); Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of Educ., 279 F. Supp. 190, 203
(M.D. Tenn. 1968).
17. See Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Soglin v. Kauff-
man, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp.
[Vol. 55:116
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those which may curtail first amendment freedoms by prior re-
straint.' s In one of the most recent decisions dealing with school
regulations, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,'9 the Supreme Court struck down a high school
regulation that required students protesting the Vietnam war
to remove their black armbands during school hours. The Court
held that first amendment rights do apply to students, even to
high school students, but limited "in light of the special character-
istics of the school environment. 2 0 When there is a showing of
substantial interference with proper school discipline, school of-
ficials may reasonably regulate to maintain discipline within the
school and to carry out the purposes of the educational institu-
tion.21 The Supreme Court found in Tinker that school officials
had sought to punish students for purely "silent, passive expres-
sion of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance
... .,"22 The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the trial
court that the regulations were reasonable due to school officials'
fear of disturbance. The Court stated that the right to freedom
of expression cannot be eroded merely because of an apprehen-
sion of harm or conflict, reasoning that under our constitutional
system certain chances must be taken.2 3 Applying this rationale
to student demonstration, the Court would not seem willing to
allow a college administration to ban all demonstrations merely
because of a fear that disturbances might result much less be-
cause the administration disagreed with or disliked the reasons
for the demonstration. However, the demonstration could be
228 (S.D. W.Va. 1968), aff'd, 399 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 905 (1969); Zanders v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 F.
Supp. 747 (W.D. La. 1968).
18. Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393
U.S. 175 (1968); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d
749 (5th Cir. 1966); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966);
Hammond v. South Carolina State College, 272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C.
1967).
19. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See Comment, 54 MIx. L. REv. 721
(1970).
20. 393 U.S. at 506.
21. Id. at 513. The Court relied on two cases from the Fifth Circuit,
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d, 744 (1966) and Blackwell v. Issaquena
County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (1966). Burnside stated that students
have a constitutional right to wear "freedom buttons" in school as a
medium of expression as long as this does not cause disorder or the in-
fringement of the rights of others. In Blackwell, the evidence showed
that those wearing "freedom buttons" caused disturbance and inter-
fered with the rights of others by pinning buttons on other students.
The court held this not to be constitutionally protected expression.
22. 393 U.S. at 508.
23. Id.
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subject to reasonable and nondiscriminatory regulations of time,
place and manner; if the demonstration substantially or mate-
rially interfered with the orderly processes of the school or in-
vaded the rights of others, the administration would have a valid
right to control it and to discipline the disrupters. 24
The Esteban court applied the Tinker standard to a dis-
ruptive demonstration and ruled that it was not clearly erron-
eous to find that both Esteban and Roberds were "participants"
in unruly demonstrations and therefore subject to expulsion. In
so doing the court deferred to the trial court's procedural ap-
proach of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence produced
in the disciplinary proceedings conducted by school officials. 2
The case against Esteban was clear. Although the evidence did
not show that he was actually involved in the demonstration,
he was found to have insubordinated a college official, directed
obscene language at a school official and threatened a resident
assistant, each of whom were attempting to prevent any further
mob violence.26 There was no showing of a denial of freedom
of speech because Esteban was disciplined on the basis of conduct
disrespectful to his superiors. 27
The case against Roberds, however, proceeded on different
facts, and is deserving of careful analysis. Prior to the demon-
strations, Roberds had been placed on disciplinary probation.
He had asked the dean of men what repercussions his involve-
ment in future demonstrations or disturbances would have on
his probationary status. He was told that "any action on your
part which may reflect unfavorably upon either you or the insti-
tution can be considered grounds for suspension. ' 28  The evi-
dence also revealed a letter written by Roberds to his state rep-
resentative concerning the school's regulations and the way the
24. See Wright, supra note 4, at 1037-59.
25. The scope of review of the district court seems to have been
based on the "General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and
Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institu-
tions of Higher Education," 45 F.R.D. 133 (1968) which states at 147:
"The third requirement is that no disciplinary action be taken [by the
academic institution] on grounds which are not supported by any sub-
stantial evidence." On review the federal district court would deter-
mine only if the challenged disciplinary action lacked support by "sub-
stantial evidence." This scope of review seems identical to that of a
federal district court reviewing an action of a federal agency. See
Administrative Procedure Act § 10e, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1967).
26. 415 F.2d at 1080.
27. Id. at 1092 (dissent).
28. Id. at 1081.
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institution was being operated.29 The findings showed that Ro-
berds was present as part of the crowd on both evenings, and
that on both occasions he conversed with members of the crowd,
the second night discussing the events that were occurring and
his disgust with the college.30 Roberds termed his presence as
that of a "spectator" as opposed to a "participant" in the violent
acts. The president of the college, who made the only eviden-
tiary findings concerning Roberds, verified that he was indeed
only a "spectator."31
The regulations in effect at the time stated that participation
in an unlawful mass gathering would be grounds for dismissal.
The regulation, however, also indicated that spectators, who by
their presence added to the problem, could be considered partici-
pants and would be held as responsible as the actual disrupters.3 2
The court found Roberds to have been within the regulation
because of his presence as part of the crowd and his conversa-
tion with both participants and onlookers.3 3 Since Roberds had
been placed on disciplinary probation, the court implied that he
was certainly capable of performing misdeeds. 34 By writing to
his representative and communicating with the dean of men,
29. The letter stated:
I assure you, I do not stand alone in my disgust with thisinstitution. From suppression of speech and expression to ri-diculous, trivial regulations this college has done more todiscourage democratic belief than any of the world's tyrants...My comrades and I plan on turning this school into a Berkeley
if something isn't done.Id.
30. 415 F.2d at 1080-81.
31. "Mr. Roberds has repeatedly admitted attending the demon-
strations on both nights but qualifies his attendance as being that of a
spectator and the evidence does not show otherwise .... " Id. at 1082(emphasis added).
32. Id. The regulation stated:
When a breach of regulations involves a mixed group, ALLMEMBERS ARE HELD EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE.
Conduct unbefitting a student which reflects adversely uponhimself or the institution will result in disciplinary action.
Mass Gatherings-Participation in mass gatherings which
might be considered as unruly or unlawful will subject a stu-dent to possible immediate dismissal from the college. Only a
few students intentionally get involved in mob misconduct, but
many so-called 'spectators' get drawn into a fracas and by their
very presence contribute to the dimensions of the problems. It
should be understood that the College considers no students tobe immune from due process of law enforcement when he isin violation as an individual or as a member of a crowd(emphasis added).
Id. at 1082.
33. Id. at 1084-85.
34. Id. at 1088.
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he also showed his intent to participate in a demonstration. "
Thus, the court reasoned that although Roberds did not cause
any physical damage, he was a participant by being present and
voicing his beliefs. 36 The court concluded that there was "sub-
stantial and certainly adequate support for the inferences the
trial court drew and for its findings.
'37
The Esteban court in refuting Roberds' free speech and free
assembly arguments went directly to Tinker, admitting that
while students do have constitutional rights, Roberds' actions
disclosed "actual or potentially disruptive conduct, aggressive
action, disorder and disturbance, and acts of violence and partici-
pation therein"3 and were, therefore, not protected.
Roberds' final argument, that the regulation was void for
vagueness and overbreadth, was summarily dismissed by the
court. Roberds' argument took three approaches. He contended
that the regulations were similar to city ordinances which have
been struck down because of insufficient definition. Second, he
argued that "young people should be told clearly what is right
and what is wrong, as well as the consequences of their acts."3 9
His third approach was that the regulations "chilled" his first
and fourteenth amendment rights. 40  The majority initially
stated that the "charges against Esteban and Roberds did not
even refer to the regulations"'41 and that Roberds was disci-
plined because of participation in the face of specific warning
from the dean.42 The court reasoned that even if the charges
did refer to the regulation, there was no reason to draw analogies
between student discipline and criminal procedure, since a col-
lege has its own purpose quite different from that of the criminal
35. Id. at 1084-85.
36. Id. at 1085.
He was there as "a part of the gathered crowd." He, too, may
not have stopped any automobile or rocked it or forced out its
occupants or damaged property, but these incidents took place
and were caused by the mob, and he was a part of that mob
... one may participate by being present and "talking it
up" as Roberds concededly did.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1087. The court also relied on Barker v. Hardway, 283
F. Supp. 228 (S.D. W.Va.), aff'd, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 905 (1968) which stated that acts and conduct exceeding the
bounds of peaceful protest and in violation of rules and regulations is
subject to the power of the administrative authority to take all necessary
action and to invoke disciplinary procedures in effect against those re-
sponsible.
39. 415 F.2d at 1087.
40. Id. at 1088.
41. Id.
42. Id.
[Vol. 55:116
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law.43 The court stated that regulations in the academic area
can be flexible and reasonably broad and that such regulations
pose no constitutional problem since they are more like codes
of general conduct than criminal statutes.44
The major deficiencies in the Esteban decision stem from
evidentiary problems. The district court would review student
disciplinary action taken by school authorities only to deter-
mine if the challenged action was supported by substantial evi-
dence.45 The court of appeals stated that its standard of review
was whether, on the entire record, the findings of the district
court were or were not clearly erroneous. 46
Judge Lay, dissenting, argued that federal courts do not
have jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act 47 to review student
disciplinary actions except in limited circumstances. He con-
tended that federal courts lack the competence to judge disci-
plinary procedure in the area of public education and should
therefore defer such action to the schools, localities, and finally
the states as the ultimate protectors of their own schools. 48 How-
ever, he argued that when conflicting evidence exists as to a
43. Id. In regard to the regulation involved in this case, supra note
32, the court found that it was not difficult to understand and that even
"the college student, who is appropriately expected to possess some
minimum intelligence, would not find it difficult."
44. 415 F.2d at 1088. The court distinguished between this regu-
lation and the regulations in Hammond v. South Carolina State College,
272 F. Supp. 947 (D.S.C. 1967) and Dickey v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967) both of which were struck
down because of prior restraint on first amendment rights. In Ham-
mond, students gathered together as a group to demonstrate peacefully
in violation of a rule against unauthorized demonstrations. The college
regulation was struck down because it prohibited all demonstrations
without prior approval without limiting its applicability to disruptive
demonstration. In Dickey, a student editor published an editorial crit-
icising the state legislature and governor and was expelled because of a
rule forbidding such publication. The regulation was struck down be-
cause the regulation in effect required forfeiture of the right to free
speech as a condition to enrollment. 415 F.2d at 1089.
45. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 290 F. Supp. 622, 631 (W.
D. Mo. 1968).
The term "substantial evidence" is construed to confer finality
upon an administrative decision on the facts when, upon an
examination of the entire record the evidence, including the in-
ferences therefrom, is found to be such that a reasonable man,
acting reasonably, might have reached the decision.
Hearings on S.674, S.675 and S.918 Before the Subcomm. on Adminis-
trative Procedure of the Senate Comm. on. the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 3, at 1356 (1941). See note 31 supra.
46. 415 F.2d at 1083. See Fm. R. Cirv. P. 52(a) (1968).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
48. 415 F.2d at 1090-91.
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denial of a federal right under the Civil Rights Act, a federal
court should make its own independent findings of fact and con-
clusions of law as to whether in fact or law a state has denied
the plaintiff a federal right. The dissent concluded that a fed-
eral court should not review the "substantiality" of the evidence
as found by the school authorities or any other agency of the
state.
49
Requiring a trial de novo on a claim relating to a denial
of a federal right5 0 seems justifiable in certain circumstances but
may have some serious drawbacks. It is certainly true that some
college administrators will be more concerned with maintaining
orderliness than in protecting the dissemination of unpopular
viewpoints and attacks against their administration. Thus, there
would be the constant possibility of bias or prejudice in a college
hearing not present in a federal court on a trial de novo. Simi-
larly, administrators are not uniformly capable of distinguishing
what they consider to be desirable or acceptable as regulations
from what a court would consider acceptable on constitutional
grounds. Thus there may be an element of arbitrariness in a
hearing conducted by the school administration which would
not be present in a federal court.51 Finally, it appears that fed-
eral judges are best equipped to handle and decide constitutional
issues; college administrators are best able to determine the type
of discipline required in the classroom. 52
The adverse effects of granting a trial de novo at the federal
level, however, are numerous. Although problems of prejudice
and arbitrariness might be alleviated, the institutional autonomy
of a college or university might be unduly impugned in reaching
these goals. A system that would allow independent findings
of fact and conclusions of law by a federal court may to some
degree deter academic decision-makers from fully exercising
their own independent judgment even within the boundaries
set by due process; 53 that is, administrators might yield to acts
49. Id. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 421 (1962).
50. On a trial de novo, plaintiff would have the burden of proving,
by the preponderance of the evidence, that his federal rights were de-
nied. Id. at 1092 (dissent).
51. See Perkins, The University and Due Process, in PARADOX,
PROCESS AND PROGRESS 33 (R. Roskens & R. White eds. 1968).
52. Charles Alan Wright says "the courts are expert in applying
the first amendment and the due process clause, but the persons on
campus are the experts in deciding the academic value of a particular
piece of work." Wright, supra note 4, at 1070.
53. For a discussion of the adverse effects of granting a new hearing
and trial at the federal level plus other effects of judicial review of
[Vol. 55:116
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which would not be constitutionally protected to avoid the possi-
bility of ensuing court action. There is also the possibility of
shifting the burden of decision-making to the courts. A trial de
novo on all aspects of the case would be time consuming and
expensive; administrators would be compelled to spend a greater
amount of time on legal questions and less time on the overall
functioning of the college. If, on the other hand, the findings
and conclusions of law of the administrative disciplinary body
are accorded some weight on review, it is submitted that such
administrators would be less likely to hesitate to fulfill their
proper function. Judicial deference, tempered with judicial scru-
tiny should cause college administrators to act reasonably and
fairly, knowing their decisions will be subject to reversal.
The conclusion appears to be that the college or university
must have some autonomy in conducting disciplinary proceed-
ings, including those where a federal right is involved. Even
if the courts are going to defer certain administrative functions
to the disciplinary bodies of the college and review only under
a "substantial evidence" test, they must not abdicate their re-
sponsibility to protect students against overly zealous adminis-
trative action.
In Esteban the court failed in this responsibility. The evi-
dence purporting to show participation by Roberds in a violent
demonstration actually shows just the contrary. Nor could the
evidence sustain a finding that Roberds' conduct violated the
standard of constitutionally protected conduct recognized in
Tinker. The fact that he was at the demonstration is incon-
clusive because the president of the college admitted that Ro-
berds was merely a "spectator"54 and both the district and appel-
late courts concluded that the president was justified in this
conclusion. The fact that he wrote to his state representative
and conversed with the dean of men concerning conduct incon-
sistent with that of a "spectator" does not make him a '"partici-
pant" in the act itself when the evidence surrounding the demon-
stration itself established the contrary. In short, from the evi-
dence presented, it cannot be said that Roberds himself dis-
rupted classwork, invaded the rights of others or caused sub-
stantial disorder such that under Tinker the college would have
the right to discipline him.
college disciplinary proceedings, see Byse, The Universitj and Due
Process: A Somewhat Different View, in PAoDox, Procass AND Po-
GRESS 51 (1. Roskens & I. White eds. 1968).
54. 415 F.2d at 1082.
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Finally, the Esteban court concluded that regulations such
as those involved in the disciplinary proceedings are constitu-
tional, there being no requirement that regulations be framed
definitively.55 However, if substantive due process is to have
any meaning at all for students, a regulation must be framed
in a manner which is both fair and reasonable.50 The regulation
at Central Missouri5 7 fails in these respects because it is capable
of many interpretations. Words like "participation," "unruly
and unlawful," "spectators" and "presence" all create definitional
problems, as Esteban illustrates, and if not defined clearly leave
too much for the unqualified discretion of those who apply the
regulation. Phrases and sentences such as, "many so-called
'spectators' get drawn into a fracas and by their very presence
contribute to the dimensions of the problems" 8 pose questions
of interpretation. Does this phrase mean that all "spectators,"
even those standing by or brought to the scene of the demonstra-
tion by the commotion, are to be treated the same as disruptive
demonstrators because by physically being there they add to the
problems of control and incite the violent to even greater de-
struction? Or does the phrase in the regulation apply only to
those who initially merely watch but eventually become par-
takers in the activities of the disrupters?59
Secondly, the regulation fails because it reaches behavior
protected by the first amendment. 60 The Central Missouri regula-
tion, applied in the manner in which the president applied it, puts
both peaceful demonstrators and those present as mere onlookers
55. Id. at 1088.
56. See Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. Rsv.
1027, 1064 (1969). Wright says:
If rules of this generality are permissable then students have
gained something, but not very much, from the decisions re-
quiring procedural safeguards to be observed. It will do a
student very little good to be given every protection of proce-dural due process ever thought of anywhere if, in the end, he
may be expelled because the tribunal is free to apply a sub-jective judgment about what is acceptable conduct. This would
be neither fair nor reasonable.
57. See Regulation quoted supra note 32.
58. Id.
59. The president of the college stated that the regulation "is to
prevent an unauthorized gathering of students which gatherings are ...
made up of a great number of spectators. It is the spectators that
create the mass which in turn leads, as in this case, to incidents of
unruly and violent action." 415 F.2d at 1093 (dissent).
60. This is commonly called the "overbreadth" concept. One who
has violated a statute by conduct not constitutionally protected may
still have the statute declared void on its face if it also purports to
reach other behavior that is constitutionally protected. See Aptheker
v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 516-17 (1964).
[Vol. 55:116
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in the same class as the disrupters. Such a regulation effec-
tively "chills" the first amendment rights of onlookers and
peaceful demonstrators. 1 Students have two choices-either to
assert their constitutional rights and attend college at the mercy
of the disciplinary body or to leave their constitutional rights at
home.
The Seventh Circuit has passed on the question of how
definitive school regulations should be and has come to the con-
clusion that "the constitutional doctrines of vagueness and over-
breadth are applicable, in some measure, to the standard or
standards to be applied by the university in disciplining its stu-
dents .... ,,62 This seems to be the better of two worlds if
courts are going to uphold student freedoms within the academic
arena.
In the final analysis, a balance must be reached between
student rights, including the right to demonstrate and express
views, and the right of the college or university to create reason-
able rules and regulations. In Tinker, the Supreme Court moved
towards this balance by recognizing both the right of students
to exercise first amendment freedoms and the right of colleges
to maintain order and discipline. In Esteban, the Eighth CircuitG3
61. [T]he regulation in this instance makes it clear that spec-
tators will be considered to be contributing to the mass gathering and
will be subject to similar disciplinary action." 415 F.2d at 1093-94
(dissent).
62. Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 991 (WM). Wis. 1968),
afJfd, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969). In Soglin, the University of Wisconsin
asserted authority to discipline disruptive students, 295 F. Supp. at 982-
83: (1) for 'misconduct'; and (2) for violations of chapter 11:02 of the
Laws and Regulations of the University which provided [students]
'"may support causes by lawful means which do not disrupt the opera-
tions of the University.. . ." The district court struck both of these
grounds down as being vague and overbroad and stated that:
[Sluch vagueness or overbreadth, or both, are impermissible in
the First Amendment area when the potential of serious dis-
ciplinary sanction exists. When the standards of vagueness
and overbreadth are applied to Chapter 11.02, however mildly,
I am obliged to find it invalid. Neither the element of in-
tention, nor that of proximity of cause and effect, nor that of
substantiality, for example, is dealt with by its language. Nor
does it contain even the most general description of the kinds of
conduct which might be considered disruptive of the operations
of the university, nor does it undertake to draw any distinctions
whatever as among the various categories of university "opera-
tions."
Id. at 993.
63. At this time there seems to be a definite conflict between the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits concerning the requirements of specificity in
regulations. The Esteban court explicitly rejected the holdings of the
Soglin lower court. However, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Soglin
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retreated from this balance by tipping the scales in favor of the
college's inherent power to discipline to the detriment of indi-
vidual student rights.
decision, 418 F.2d 163 (1969), stating:
To the extent that Esteban v. Central Missouri State Col-
lege . . . refuses to apply standards of vagueness and over-
breadth required of universities by the Fourteenth Amendment
we decline to follow it.
Id. at 168.
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Constitutional Law: Failure of Local Board to
Reopen Selective Service Classification
Held Denial of Due Process
Defendant, prosecuted for refusing induction into the armed
forces, contended that he was denied due process when his local
draft board, contrary to selective service regulations,' refused to
reopen his I-A classification after he had furnished evidence that
he was satisfactorily pursuing a full time course of under-
graduate instruction. The district court found no violation of
due process since the noncompliance with the regulations had
not been prejudicial to the defendant.2 The Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit, per Lay, J., reversed, holding that the
board's failure to reopen defendant's classification constituted a
violation of due process and was also prejudicial. United States
v. Rundle, 413 F.2d 329 (8th Cir. 1969).
The courts will generally overturn the classification of a
registrant only in instances where the classification has no basis
in facts or where there has been a violation of procedural due
1. 32 C.F.R. § 1625.3 (b) (1969) provides:
The local board shall reopen and consider anew the classifica-
tion of a registrant to whom it has mailed an Order to Report
for Induction (SSS Form No. 252) whenever facts are presented
to the local board which establish the registrant's eligibility for
classification into Class I-S because he is satisfactorily pursu-
ing a full-time course of instruction at a college, university or
similar institution of learning.
32 C.F.R. § 1625.14 (1969) states:
The reopening of the classification of a registrant by the local
board shall cancel any Order To Report for Induction (SSS
Form No. 252) or Order To Report for Civilian Work and State-
ment of Employer (SSS Form No. 153) which may have been is-
sued to the registrant....(emphasis added).
2. United States v. Rundle, 300 F. Supp. 477 (S.D. Iowa 1968).
3. At one time, a substantial number of cases pertaining to sec-
tion 10 (a) (2) of the Selective Training and Service Act of Sept. 16, 1940,
ci. 720, § 10(a) (2), 54 Stat. 893, interpreted the phrase "[t]he decisions
of such local boards shall be final . . ." to mean that in a criminal
prosecution for refusing induction the courts could not review the
propriety of a registrant's classification. Judicial inquiry was limited
solely to a determination of whether a registrant, in fact, had received
an induction notice and had failed to report. Falbo v. United States, 320
U.S. 549 (1944); United States v. Flakowicz, 146 F.2d 874, 875 (2d Cir.
1945); Biron v. Collins, 145 F.2d 758, 759 (5th Cir. 1944); United States v.
Sauler, 139 F.2d 173, 174 (7th Cir. 1943). However, the Supreme Court
disapproved this approach in Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122
(1946):
The provision making the decisions of the local boards "final"
means to us that Congress chose not to give administrative ac-
tion under this Act the customary scope of judicial review
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process 4 or "blatant" lawlessness by the board.5 Although a
registrant has been able to obtain direct judicial review in
certain instances of patently illegal acts," the courts normally
review the propriety of a classification only when it is used as
the basis for a habeas corpus petition for release from the armed
service or as a defense to prosecution for refusing induction. 7
If the registrant is convicted, he may be imprisoned for not
more than five years or fined not more than $10,000 or both.,
The criminal penalties and the narrow scope of judicial re-
view 9 have caused courts to state that the local boards must
which obtains under other statutes. It means that the courts are
not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classifica-
tion made by the local board was justified. The decisions of
the local boards made in conformity with the regulations are
final even though they may be erroneous. The question of juris-
diction of the local board is reached only if there is no basis
in fact for the classification which it gave the registrant.
This scope of review was applied to the Selective Service Act of June
24, 1948, ch. 625, § 10(b) (3), 62 Stat. 619, which contained the same
finality provision as the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.
The Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. § 460 (3) (Supp. IV,
1967) explicitly incorporates the "no basis in fact" scope of review:
No judicial review shall be made of the classification . . . ex-
cept as a defense to a criminal prosecution instituted under sec-
tion 12 of this title . . .: Provided, That such review shall go
to the question of the jurisdiction herein reserved to local
boards, appeal boards, and the President only when there is no
basis in fact for the classification assigned to such registrant.
4. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955).
5. Oestereich v. Selective Service System, 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
Blatant lawlessness, in this context, is distinguishable from a violation
of due process in that the denials of due process concern procedural
defects, whereas lawlessness involves the use of extra-legal considera-
tions in determining a registrant's status.
6. Id. at 238. In Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256, 258 (1968), the
Court held that the use of an injunctive suit to enjoin induction would
be sustained as a means of reviewing a registrant's classification only
when board action was in conflict with rights explicitly given the
registrant by statute and not dependent upon an act of judgment by
the board.
7. 50 U.S.C. § 460 (3) (Supp. IV, 1967) quoted note 3 supra.
8. 50 U.S.C. §§ 462(a) & (b) (Supp. IV, 1967). However, the
United States Attorney's Office in Minnesota normally drops any crim-
inal action pending against a registrant who agrees to undergo induc-
tion. Parole boards also show a willingness to grant parole to anybody
convicted of violating the Selective Service Act if such party will en-
ter the armed service. Interview with Earl J. Cudd, First Assistant to
the United States Attorney of Minnesota in St. Paul, Minnesota, January
19, 1970.
9. In reality, the scope of judicial review of the selective service
process is much broader than what theory would indicate. Approxi-
mately 30 percent of the convictions in Minnesota for violation of the
Selective Service Act are eventually reversed. Id.
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follow selective service regulations to the letter and that a
failure to do so will constitute a violation of due process and
nullify any order of the board.'0 In practice, however, the courts
reduce this self-enunciated principle of strict adherence to
rhetoric by using either a "harmless error" or "substantial right"
approach. The former rule provides that due process is satisfied
unless the board's failure to comply with regulations prejudi-
cially affected the registrant." The judiciary has not attempted
to formulate a comprehensive definition of prejudice in this
context, but rather has taken a case-by-case approach. Exami-
nation of the cases, however, indicates that the essential element
in establishing prejudice is a showing that the registrant could
have effectively used that which he has been denied, or that
the board's error was material to the classification received. 12
The controverted area of the harmless error rule lies in the
allocation of the burden of proof for prejudice. The allocation is
10. E.g., Olvera v. United States, 223 F.2d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1955).
11. Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 384 (1955); Eagles v.
Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 314 (1946); United States v. Spiro, 384 F.2d 159,
161 (3d Cir. 1967); United States v. Perez, 372 F.2d 468, 469 (4th Cir.
1967); Yaich v. United States, 283 F.2d 613, 620 (9th Cir. 1960).
12. Some of the best examples of the need to show effective use or
materiality in order to establish prejudice occurred in the mid-1950's
with regard to 32 C.F.R. § 1604.41. Between January 1, 1952 and De-
cember 31, 1954, this section provided that "[a]dvisors to registrants
shall be appointed by the Director of Selective Service.... The names
and addresses of advisors to registrants within the local board area
shall be conspicuously posted in the local board office." (Currently, 32
C.F.R. § 1604.41 (1969) uses the permissive word "may" rather than the
mandatory "shall".) Numerous boards failed to comply with the regu-
lation and registrants prosecuted for refusing induction alleged that
such noncompliance constituted a denial of due process. This conten-
tion was generally rejected by the courts on the ground that the regis-
trant was not injured by the noncompliance because he knew of his right
of appeal or he never requested assistance from the board. Uffelman
v. United States, 230 F.2d 297, 301 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Phil-
lips, 143 F. Supp. 496, 502 (N.D. W. Va. 1956), aff'd, 239 F.2d 148(4th Cir. 1956); United States v. Rowton, 130 F. Supp. 189, 192 (W.D.
Ky. 1955), affd, 229 F.2d 421 (6th Cir. 1956). Other examples of non-
prejudice resulting from noncompliance with regulations include a
failure to reopen formally a registrant's classification per regulation
even though the board actually does consider the individual's new claims
and does notify him of his continuance in his present classification (Wit-
mer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 384 (1955) ), a failure to offer regis-
trant three types of civilian work which meet regulation specifications
where the registrant has categorically refused any type of civilian
work (Yaich v. United States, 283 F.2d 613, 620 (9th Cir. 1960) ), and an
inadequate summary of registrant's religious beliefs made by the local
board where the appeal board had a copy of the canon laws of
registrant's church and a brochure of its essential teachings (Tyrrell v.
United States, 200 F.2d 8, 11 (9th Cir. 1952) ).
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critical since the outcome of a case will often be determined by
who has the burden of proving prejudice-the Government or
the registrant.1 3 The courts are currently divided on the issue.
A minority of courts place the burden of proving that the irreg-
ularity was non-prejudicial on the Government. 14 This allocation
is justified in terms of the criminal penalties imposed upon viola-
tors of the Selective Service Act. The rationale is that the pre-
sumption of innocence applies and is best implemented by plac-
ing the burden of proof upon the Government.'5 The majority
position, which places the burden of proving prejudice on the
registrant, is justified as a means of separating individuals who
seek to exploit mere technicalities from those who have legiti-
mate grievances.'0
The substantial right theory is the second approach mitigat-
ing the strict adherence principle. Under this approach, the
determinative factor for finding a violation of due process is
whether the board's deviation involved a substantial right or
merely a formality. If the defect involves a substantial right,
there is an automatic violation of due process. No precise defi-
nition of substantial rights has been formulated other than an
indication that they are those things which the judiciary views
as generally necessary for a fair determination of a registrant's
status.'" Prime examples of substantial rights are the right to
have a classification reopened when new evidence about a regis-
13. See Wilson, The Selective Service System, An Administrative
Obstacle Course, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 2123, 2157 (1966).
14. The jurisdictions which have dealt with this issue are the
First, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits. Only the First
and Seventh Circuits have placed the burden of prejudice on the Gov-
ernment. See United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246, 250 (7th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Spiro, 384 F.2d 159, 161 (3d Cir. 1967); Pate v. United
States, 243 F.2d 99, 104 (5th Cir. 1957); Steele v. United States, 240 F.2d
142, 146 (1st Cir. 1956); Kaline v. United States, 235 F.2d 54, 59 (9th Cir.
1956); Rowton v. United States, 229 F.2d 421, 422 (6th Cir. 1956).
15. Steele v. United States, 240 F.2d 142, 146 (1st Cir. 1956).
16. United States v. Lawson, 337 F.2d 800, 813 (3d Cir. 1964); Kaline
v. United States, 235 F.2d 54, 59 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Mekoli-
chick, 234 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir. 1956). Such logic seems highly relevant to
the issue of whether an irregularity should constitute a violation of due
process per se or whether some prejudicial effect should be required.
Such an argument, however, does not address the question of who
should bear the burden of proof on the issue.
17. Substantial right, in essence, represents a conclusion by the
court that something is so fundamental to its sense of fairness or to
the procedural safeguards of the system that as a general policy mat-
ter, noncompliance will not be tolerated. The possibility of prejudice,
in a broad sense, undoubtedly has a role in determining how funda-
mental a particular provision is.
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trant's status is presented18 and the right to have notification of
classification after the board has evaluated the new evidence.19
The problems of the harmless error and substantial right
theories were squarely presented to the Eighth Circuit in the in-
stant case. Defendant was a student at Iowa State University
who was delinquent in his tuition payments and consequently
failed to obtain university certification of his attendance. He
was classified I-A and on May 5, 1967 received a notice to report
for induction on June 28th. On May 8th, defendant requested
a IH-S classification, since he was in school but had not paid his
tuition. Four days later the university verified his claim but
the local board failed to take any action. On June 23rd, defendant
withdrew his request for a student deferment and requested con-
scientious objector status. Pursuant to the recommendation of
the State Director of Selective Service, the local board voted
unanimously not to reopen the classification.2 0
18. Davis v. United States, 410 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1967); Miller v. United States,
388 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Vincelli, 215 F.2d 210 (2d Cir.
1954). 32 C.FR. § 1625.2 (1969) provides: "[t]he local board may re-
open and consider anew the classification of a registrant (a) upon the
written request of the registrant... if such request is accompanied by
written information presenting facts not considered when the registrant
was classified, which, if true would justify a change in the registrant's
classification" (emphasis added). In Olvera v. United States, 233 F.2d
880, the court interpreted "may reopen" as obliging the board to reopen
if the registrant presented new data which if true would justify re-
classification. This right to reopen seems to be fundamental because it
relates directly to a decision on the merits and to the right of personal
appearance and appeal. See note 19 infra.
19. United States v. Fry, 203 F.2d 638 (2d Cir. 1953); United States
v. Stiles, 169 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. Strebel, 103 F.
Supp. 628 (D.C. Kan. 1952). 32 C.F.R. § 1625.12 (1969) provides "[w]hen
the local board reopens the registrant's classification, it shall, as
soon as practicable after it has again classified the registrant, mail no-
tice thereof. . . ." The rationale of emphasizing such notice is that it is
necessary for a registrant to know of the board's action before he can
exercise his right of personal appearance before the local board and of
appeal to the state board (32 C.F.R. § 1625.13 (1969) ). These rights
are viewed as fundamental safeguards against arbitrary action by the
local board.
20. Certain other facts should be mentioned as supporting the
court's conclusion that Rundle was malingering. 413 F.2d at 334. The
defendant had- been delinquent in his tuition payments -four times
previously and had been classified I-A and then H-S upon eventual uni-
versity certification of his attendance. The local board indicated a will-
ingness to recommend postponement of Rundle's induction so he could
finish summer school and obtain his degree. Rundle refused to au-
thorize the university to release certain routine information regarding
his enrollment in summer school and his baccalaureate status. He also
submitted a letter denouncing the Vietnam war and requested a Peace
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Defendant, prosecuted for refusing induction, contended that
the board had acted arbitrarily in refusing to reopen his classi-
fication as required by regulation.2 1 The district court found no
violation of due process because defendant was not prejudiced
by the board's failure to follow regulations. The court based
this finding on the following factors: defendant had refused to
cooperate and provide the board with further information about
his schooling,22 registrant's I-A classification would have been
appropriate a few days later because of the end of the school
quarter and defendant had voluntarily terminated his studies
at the end of spring quarter.
The Eighth Circuit found that the board's failure to reopen
registrant's classification deprived him of a substantial right,
and that such a deprivation constituted a violation of due process
per se regardless of prejudice. The court also found that the
board's failure to follow regulations prejudiced the defendant in
three ways. First, he was deprived of his right to continue his
studies. Under selective service law, defendant's deferment
lasted from September to September and not from September
to May. 23 Second, the refusal to reopen defendant's classifica-
tion per regulation deprived him of his right of personal appear-
ance before the local board and of his right of appeal to the
state board. Third, the failure to cancel registrant's induction
order imposed upon him a higher burden of proof for his con-
scientious objector claim. Had there been no induction order
outstanding, defendant would simply have had to make a prima
facie case for conscientious objector status. However, with such
an order outstanding, the registrant had to show that his con-
Corps deferment before making his eleventh hour conscientious ob-jector claim.
21. See note 1 supra.
22. Logically, Rundle's failure to cooperate should have no bear-
ing on the question of whether board failure to follow regulations was
prejudicial.
23. Though not dispositive, the court's conclusion that defendant's
II-S deferment entitled him to 12 months in which to complete his
senior year's work can be challenged on two grounds. First, the board's
willingness to postpone induction so that defendant could graduate, if
he demonstrated that he was in fact going to attend summer school,
eliminated any complaint about being deprived of a right to graduate.
Second, if defendant in fact was not going to attend summer school, the
court's interpretation of a blanket 12 month deferment for a graduate
would be at loggerheads with Local Board Memorandum No. 43,
July 26, 1968, SELECTIVE SERVICE LAW REPORTER 2174, which in com-
menting on the 12 month provision of 32 C.F.R. § 1622.25(b) (1969),
stated "Student classifications should be reopened when the student
ceases to be in the status for which he was deferred."
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scientious objector claims resulted from circumstances over
which he had no control.
The principal criticism of Rundle concerns the court's inter-
mingling of the prejudice and substantial right concepts. The
thrust of the opinion is certainly that the right to have a classi-
fication reopened as specified by regulation is so important and
fundamental that any failure by the local board to comply is a
denial of due process.24 However, the court obscures this basic
conclusion by its undertaking to demonstrate that the registrant
was prejudiced by the board's failure to adhere to regula-
tions.25 Also, the court's explication of how Rundle was in fact
prejudiced by the board's action fails to deal with the adversity
element essential to proving prejudice. Rather, two of the three
findings of prejudice are couched solely in terms of deprivation
of a right to continue one's studies or deprivation of a right to
personal appearance and appeal.20  Because substantial right
and harmless error are distinct approaches to the question of due
process, confusion results from the mixing of such terminology.
Adding to the confusion of the court's analysis is its failure
to definitively state what constitutes a substantial right and
what criteria are to be used in the determination.
Another major problem with the Rundle decision relates to
the court's position on conscientious objector claims submitted
after an induction order has been mailed. The court states
that the registrant has a higher burden of proof when an induc-
tion order is outstanding since he must show that his con-
scientious objector claims stem from circumstances over which
he had no control. 7  Lacking such an outstanding order, the
registrant would merely have to make a prima facie showing of
a change in status.2 8 This approach is simply an adoption of the
view that belated conscientious objector claims may or may not
be based upon a change in circumstances over which the regis-
trant had no control. 29 The drawback of this tack, which the
24. 413 F.2d at 334.
25. Id. at 333.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Vaughn v. United States, 404 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1968).
29. See United States v. Geary, 368 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1966); Keane
v. United States, 266 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1959). Some jurisdictions
have held that belated conscientious objector claims always involve a
change in status over which the registrant had controL United States
v. Jennison, 402 F.2d 51 (6th Cir. 1968); Davis v. United States, 374
F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Ali-Majied Muhammad, 364 F.2d
223 (4th Cir. 1966). Others have held that such a claim is never a change
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court fails to overcome, is the difficulty of developing any type
of meaningful criteria for its application."
In the future, the court should refrain from using the sub-
tantial right approach on due process questions. It is too
mechanical and does not deal with the equities of a given factual
situation. Furthermore, it is an imprecise analytical tool. The
definition of substantial right has been propounded by other
courts only in the broadest of terms, as that right necessary for
a fair operation of the system;3 1 such a definition is conclusory
in nature and provides no criteria for decision-making. The
prejudice requirement, on the other hand, constitutes a more
flexible and functional analytical tool. It can cope with the
nuances of individual cases and, if the burden of proving preju-
dice is placed on the Government,3 2 it strikes a reasonable
balance between individual rights and the interests of society.
in status over which the registrant had control. United States v. Under-
wood, 151 F. Supp. 874 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
30. Note, Pre-Induction Availability of the Right to Claim Consci-
entious Objector Exemption, 72 YALE L.J. 1459 (1963). Arguments have
been made that congressional intent best accords with the view that
conscientious objector claims always involve a change in circumstances
beyond the control of the registrant. Proponents maintain that such
an approach can be readily and consistently applied and -will have only
a negligible impact on the efficiency of the selective service system.
Id. at 1467.
31. See text accompanying notes 17-19 supra.
32. See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
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Jurisdiction: Transnational Rental Business Not Amenable
to Process in Wrongful Death Action Arising
in Foreign Jurisdiction
A U-Haul cargo trailer, pulled on Nebraska highways, struck
a pedestrian on a bridge, inflicting fatal injuries. The driver of
the car had rented the trailer, owned by defendant U-Haul Com-
pany of North Carolina, from a U-Haul dealer in California. In
a wrongful death action, plaintiff, as administrator of the pedes-
trian's estate, sought to establish jurisdiction in Nebraska over
defendant U-Haul Company under the Nebraska Nonresident
Motor Vehicle Statute,' the Nebraska Business Corporation Act -
and the Nebraska long-arm statute.3 The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of jurisdiction,
holding that defendant U-Haul Company was not amenable to
service of process under the Nonresident Motor Vehicle Statute
because it was not involved in the "use or operation" of the
trailer on Nebraska highways; nor was the defendant amenable
to service of process under the Business Corporation Act because
U-Haul Company of North Carolina was not "doing business"
within the state. Peterson v. U-Haul Company, 409 F.2d 1174
(8th Cir. 1969).
Obtaining personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
1. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-530 (1964). The statute in part provides:
(1) The use and operation by a nonresident of the State of
Nebraska or his agent of a motor vehicle .. . within .. . Ne-
braska, shall be deemed an appointment, by such nonresident,
of the Secretary of State . . . upon whom may be served all
legal processes in any action . .. against him, growing out of
such use or operation of a motor vehicle... within this state.
2. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-20, 114 (Supp. 1967). This "doing busi-
ness" statute is part of Nebraska's Business Corporation Act and pro-
vides:
Whenever a foreign corporation shall do business in this state,
and fails to appoint or maintain a registered agent in this state,
... the Secretary of State shall be an agent of such corporation
upon which... process ... may be served.
3. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-536 (Supp. 1967). The statute provides
for personal jurisdiction over a corporation in a cause of action which
arises from the corporation's "transacting any business" in Nebraska,
Id. § 25-536(1) (a), or causing tortious injury in Nebraska by an act
or omission outside the state if the corporation "regularly does or solicits
business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or de-
rives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered" in the state. Id. § 25-536(1) (d) (emphasis added). The
statute is copied from the UNIFOrm INTRSaSTATE & INTENAT ONAL Pno-
cEDuRE ACT § 1.03 (1962). The district court in Peterson did not dis-
cuss section 25-536 but the court of appeals considered its applicability
to the issues.
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has been a constant source of judicial controversy.' Early cases
followed the notion that a corporation could not be sued in other
than the state of its incorporation and any activity which a cor-
poration conducted outside its state of incorporation was de-
pendent upon the permission of the government within whose
jurisdiction the corporation desired to operate.5 With the pro-
liferation of multistate corporations, it became incumbent upon
the courts to make provision for suits by and against such entities
in foreign states.6 The "consent" and "presence" theories,7 orig-
inally used for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction over for-
eign corporations, eventually merged into the "doing business"
theory."
The due process limitations upon the extent to which a state
court can assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
were enunciated by the Supreme Court in International Shoe
Company v. Washington.9 To be subjected to in personam juris-
diction, the corporation must have certain "minimum contacts"
with the forum "such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ""
A more precise test was not formulated since a consideration of
the "quality and nature" of individual facts was deemed neces-
sary to determine the reasonableness of allowing the suit to be
brought in that state.' Subsequent decisions have held that
4. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and
the in Personam Jursidiction of State Courts* From Pennoyer to
Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHi. L. Ruv. 569 (1958); Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909,
919-23 (1960).
5. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839);
Pomeroy v. New York & N.H.R.R., 19 F. Cas. 965 (No. 11,261) (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1857); Day v. Newark India-Rubber Mfg. Co., 7 F. Cas. 245 (No.
3685) (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1850).
6. See Note, Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations in
Diversity Actions: A Tiltyard for the Knights of Erie, 31 U. Cm. L.
REv. 752, 767 (1964).
7. See Bullington, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 6
N.C.L. REv. 147 (1928).
8. For a good discussion of this history, see Hutchinson v. Chase
& Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930).
9. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See also Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312-14 (1950); Milliken v. Meyer, 311
U.S. 457 (1940), rehearing denied, 312 U.S. 712 (1941).
10. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 at 316
(1945), quoting from Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). The
Court further stated: "[Due process] demands may be met by such con-
tacts with the state of the forum as make it reasonable . . . to require
the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there."
Id. at 317.
11. Id. at 319. See Kurland, supra note 4, at 623:
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the commission of a single act is sufficient to allow assertion of
jurisdiction.' 2
The International Shoe test, phrased in terms of "minimum
contacts," "fair play" and "substantial justice," has been inter-
preted as the maximum permissible exercise of in personam
jurisdiction. A state may, however, establish jurisdictional
standards less inclusive than the constitutional limitations. 3
Thus, a foreign corporation's defense of lack of jurisdiction may
be founded on either or both of two theories: (1) statutory law
which provides the criteria for obtaining jurisdiction over for-
eign corporations and (2) the constitutional guarantee of due
process.14
Consequently, since International Shoe, many states have
revised their "doing business" statutes to take advantage of the
increased area of permissible jurisdiction." Since the concept
of "doing business" is not easily defined, ' ( it has been suggested
The Supreme Court opinions have revealed some if not all of the
factors which are to be taken into consideration in reaching a
conclusion on the issue of in personam jurisdiction. They do
not reveal how each factor is to be weighed in combination
with the others.
Thus the question of jurisdiction became primarily a factual determina-
tion for the trial court. See also Reese & Gaiston, Doing an Act or
Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IowA L.
REv. 249 (1959).
12. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957);
Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 IML 2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). See also 18 W. FLrTcHER, PRIVATE CoRPORA-
Trous § 8715 (rev. ed. 1969).
13. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
However, the state need not assert jurisdiction to the limits of the due
process clause. Perkins v. Benquet Consot Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
rehearing denied, 343 U.S 917 (1952). Cf. Uppgren v. Executive Avia-
tion Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165 (D. Minn. 1969).
14. See Note, Doing Business-A Re-Examination, 12 W. Ros. L.
REv. 89, 90 (1960).
15. Doing business" was the test which determined whether, in
federal diversity cases, a foreign corporation could be subjected to
jurisdiction in plaintiff's forum. See Note, Doing Business as a Test of
Venue and Jursidiction Over Foreign. Corporations in the Federal
Courts, 56 CoLm.v L. REv. 394, 404-08 (1956). The quantum of activity
which is necessary to subject a foreign corporation to service of process
is not standardized. Whether the general language of a "doing busi-
ness" statute authorizes service in a certain case is a matter of the par-
ticular state's interpretation of its statute. Litsinger Sign Co. v.
American Sign Co., 11 Ohio St. 2d 1, 227 N.E.2d 609 (1967).
16. Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Muegge, 127 Okla. 295, 297,
260 P. 745, 747 (1927). As one court aptly put it: "Perhaps there is no
question in the law more complicated and confused as the one attempt-
ing to define what is 'doing business' within a particular territory or
jurisdiction ... ." Snowden v. Masonic Life Ass'n of Western New
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that a uniform federal standard as to what constitutes "doing
business" should be applied in diversity cases.' 7  At present,
however, it is the federal courts' responsibility to apply the law
of the state as declared by that state's legislature or by its high-
est court.1 8  If there are no controlling state decisions, the fed-
eral court must decide the case as it believes the highest state
court would decide it.19 Since states are not required to pro-
vide jurisdiction where parties meet the minimal constitutional
requirements, 20 a two step analysis-viewing state statutes first
and then applying due process standards to the statute-is used
by the majority of the federal courts. 21 The statutory phrase
"doing business," however, has rarely been extended to the con-
stitutional limits of in personam jurisdiction.2 2 As a result, some
states have departed from the "doing business" concept and have
increased the purview of in personam jurisdiction by formulating
statutes based on other grounds.23
York, 244 Ky. 286, 290, 50 S.W.2d 569, 570 (1932). Commentators often
equate the concept of doing business with the International Shoe test
for asserting in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations. See,
e.g., 18 W. FLETCHER, supra note 12, §§ 8711, 8713, 8713.1.
17. Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 234 (2d Cir.
1963) (Clark, J. dissenting opinion); Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph Mills,
Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960) (Clark, J. majority opinion); Pike v.
New England Greyhound Lines, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 669 (D. Mass. 1950).
Green, Federal Jursidiction in Personam of Corporations and Due
Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967 (1961); Note, Diversity Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts over Foreign Corporations, 49 IOWA L. REv. 1224, 1228
n.21, 1244-45 (1964).
18. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
19. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 312 F.2d 485
(8th Cir. 1963); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159
(D.S.D. 1967); See 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRIACTICE AND
PROCEDURE, § 8, n.6.5 (Wright ed. Supp. 1968); 18 W. FLETCHER, supra
note 12, § 8706; C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 58 (1963).
20. Perkins v. Benquet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, rehearing
denied, 343 U.S. 917 (1952); Simpkins v. Council Mfg. Corp., 332 F.2d
733 (8th Cir. 1964).
21. Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706, 711 (4th Cir. 1966):
"This concept of requiring the federal courts to follow the jurisdictional
lead of the state courts in diversity cases has apparently been adopted
by the vast majority of the federal circuits." See also Arrowsmith v.
United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963) (overruling Jaftex Corp.
v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960)).
22. Note, Recent Interpretations of "Doing Business" Statutes,
44 IowA L. REV. 345 (1959). "The fundamental principle guiding the
state courts in interpreting their 'doing business' statutes seems to be
the maintenance within the jurisdiction of a regular, continuous course
of business activity." Id. at 349.
23. These are the so-called long-arm statutes. See, e.g., UNIFORM
INTERSTATE & INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE ACT § 1.03; ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968); MINN. STAT. § 543.19 (1967); Wis.
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A state's nonresident motor vehicle statute may provide an-
other ground for asserting in personam jurisdiction over a for-
eign corporation. Presently, every state has adopted some form
of nonresident motor vehicle statute 2 4 and several states have
"use and operation" statutes.2 5 The "use" concept is admittedly
broader than that of "operation."20  "Operation" is generally
interpireted as the actual physical handling of the motor vehicle,2 7
whereas "use" is considered to cover the nonresident owner of
the vehicle.28  However, the definition of "use" has not been
extended to include the nonresident lessor where his lessee is
involved in an accident. The rationale for this rule is that the
statutes require a respondeat superior relationship and the lessee
and nonresident lessor are not so related.2 9
In Peterson, defendant U-Haul Company of North Carolina"0
STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1969). See also O'Connor & Goff, Expanded
Concepts of State Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents: The Illinois Re-
vised Practice Act, 31 Noea DAwm LAw. 223 (1956). In some states the
courts have construed their state's jurisdiction statutes to make them
consistent with the International Shoe doctrine. See, e.g., Mechanical
Contractors Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Mechanical Contractors Ass'n of
Northern Cal., Inc., 342 F.2d 393 (9th Cir. 1965); Bible v. T.D. Pub-
lishing Corp., 252 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Cal. 1966); Fisher v. Mon Dak
Truck Lines, Inc., 166 N.W.2d 371 (N.D. 1969); Gray v. American Radi-
ator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961);
Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
24- In Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the Supreme Court
sustained the constitutionality of the Massachusetts Nonresident Mo-
torist Statute. The case Was cited with approval in International Shoe.
For a listing of the states and their respective statutes see Jox, Non-
Resident Motorists Service of Process Acts, 33 F.R.D. 151, 153-54 n.5(1964); Gibbons, A Survey of the Modern Nonresident Motorist Stat-
utes, 13 U. FL.a L. REv. 257 n.2 (1960).
25. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAr. ch. 95-%, § 9-301 (Smith-Hurd 1958);
MiNx. STAT. § 170.55 (1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-530 (1964); Oicr.
STAT. AiNw. tit. 47, § 391 (1962); S.D. CoMPnLn LAWs ANw. § 15-7-6 (Supp.
1969); Wis. STAT. ANT. § 345.09 (Supp. 1969). These nonresident motor
vehicle statutes provide for service of process over a nonresident who
has been using or operating the motor vehicle within the forum state.
See note 1 supra.
26. See Rose v. Gisi, 139 Neb. 593, 596, 298 N.W. 333, 335 (1941).
27. Id.; Larsen v. Powell, 117 F. Supp. 239, 241 (D. Colo. 1953).
Operating a motor vehicle applies only to the person actually driving
the car and not the nonresident owner. Morrow v. Asher, 55 F.2d 365
(NJ). Tex. 1932); Flynn v Kramer, 271 Mich. 500, 261 N.W. 77 (1935).
28. Larsen v. Powell, 117 F. Supp. 239, 241 (D. Colo. 1953) (Colo-
rado court interpreting Nebraska's Nonresident Motor Vehicle Statute).
29. E.g., Boulay v. Pontikes, 93 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Mo. 1950);
Gately v. U-Haul Co., 350 Mass. 483, 215 N.E.2d 743 (1966); Hayes
Freight Lines v. Cheatham, 277 P.2d 664 (Okla. 1954).
30. In Peterson, the driver of the car leased the U-Haul trailer
owned by defendant U-Haul Company of North Carolina from a Call-
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was not authorized to do business in Nebraska, and maintained
no office, telephone, agents, bank account or service facilities in
the state.31 Defendant's sole business activities within Nebraska
were: (1) the occasional presence of trailers owned or at least
licensed by defendant, (2) receipt of rental fees derived from one-
way or round-trip rentals initiated in North or South Carolina to
a point of destination in Nebraska and (3) benefits derived from
U-Haul advertising in Nebraska and from the protection of the
trade-name "U-Haul" under Nebraska law.
32
Plaintiff asserted jurisdiction under all the relevant Ne-
braska statutes. He asserted that defendant came within the
purview of the Nebraska Nonresident Motor Vehicle Statute-"
because, (1) the driver was acting as defendant's agent in using
the trailer on Nebraska highways and (2) defendant was engaged
in the "use" of the trailer within the meaning of that statute."
Plaintiff also argued that defendant was subject to jurisdiction
under the "doing business" provision of Nebraska's Business
Corporation Act 35 and under the provisions of the recently
adopted Nebraska long-arm statute.
30
Rejecting all of plaintiff's arguments, the Peterson court de-
nied jurisdiction under the aforementioned statutes. The initial
issue confronting the court was whether defendant was amen-
able to process under Nebraska's nonresident motorist law-
either through an agency relationship or under the "use" con-
fornia dealer. Although defendant U-Haul denied it was the "owner"
of the trailer in question, the court assumes that it was for purposes of
asserting jurisdiction. 409 F.2d 1174, 1176-77 n.2. The rental agree-
ment provided for the driver to leave the trailer at a destination in
South Dakota. Defendant U-Haul is part of an integrated group of
many corporations and entities comprising the U-Haul Rental System.
The Rental System is comprised of four divisions: Fleet Owners (capi-
tal investors), Arcoa, Inc. (performs accounting and various advisory
services for the other divisions of the System), Rental Companies (re-
sponsible for licensing, marketing and supervision of maintenance and
repair of trailers that appear in the states in which they are authorized
to operate) and Rental Dealers (rent trailers to public). As one
of the Rental Companies, defendant is responsible for advertising, li-
censing of trailers and maintaining and repairing trailers within North
Carolina and South Carolina, their authorized area to do business. De-
fendant receives a percentage of the rental income of transactions made
within its authorized area of operation.
31. 409 F.2d at 1182 n.10.
32. Id. at 1182.
33. Id. at 1176. See note 1 supra.
34. 409 F.2d at 1176, 1179.
35. Id. at 1176. See note 2 supra.
36. 409 F.2d at 1183. See note 3 supra.
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cept. Although no Nebraska court had previously been con-
fronted with this particular situation, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska had determined that the statute must be strictly con-
strued and applied only to persons specifically named therein.3
Relying upon this directive of strict construction, as well as
cases from other jurisdictions,38 the Peterson court denied the
existence of an agency relationship based upon the lease agree-
ment.39 In addition, the court concluded that the defendant's
mere ownership of the trailer did not constitute "use" as meant
by the statute. The court reasoned that the term "use" is di-
rected at a more immediate and physical employment of the ve-
hicle than merely the abstract "use" as a capital investment.40
37. Rose v. Gisi, 139 Neb. 593, 595, 298 N.W. 333, 335 (1941);
accord, Youngson v. Lusk, 96 F. Supp. 285 (D. Neb. 1951); Covert v.
Hastings Mfg. Co., 44 F. Supp. 285 (D. Neb. 1942); Downing v. Schwenck,
138 Neb. 395, 293 N.W. 278 (1940). Plaintiff urged that a Nebraska
statute, which imposes joint liability on the owner and lessee of
any leased trailer, made the driver the agent of defendant. NEB. REv.
STAT. § 39-7135 (1968) provides: "The owner of any leased ... trailer
shall be jointly and severally liable with the lessee and the operator
thereof for . . . the death of any person . . . resulting from the op-
eration thereof in this state." The court denied that the statute es-
tablished an agency relationship for purposes of the nonresident mo-
torist law and concluded that to hold so would defeat legislative intent.
38. E.g., Gately v. U-Haul Co., 350 Mass. 483, 215 N.E.2d 743
(1966).
39. Gately v. U-Haul Co., 350 Mass. 483, 215 N.E.2d 743 (1966).
Boulay v. Pontikes, 93 F. Supp. 826 (W.D. Mo. 1950). Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 506.210 (Supp. 1968) is a "use and operation" statute very similar to
Nebraska's. The Missouri court held that the driver of a leased car was
not the agent of the lessor within the purview of the nonresident motor
vehicle statute since the statute contemplated "a relationship that has
all the legal consequences of respondeat superior considered from a tort
liability standpoint." 93 F. Supp. at 828.
The Nebraska court has said that an agency "cannot be established
by the acts or declarations of the alleged agent, but must be proved
by the acts or declarations of the principal." Berg v. Midwest Laundry
Equip. Corp., 175 Neb. 423, 425, 122 N.W.2d 250, 252 (1963). In Gately,
the court analyzed the transaction as
nothing more than the rental of the trailer in Ohio to transport
the plaintiff's personal property into [Massachusetts] and the
ultimate surrender of the trailer at a prearranged place in
Boston in order to terminate responsibility under the rental
agreement.
350 Mass. at 485, 215 N.E.2d at 744.
40. 409 F.2d at 1180. By holding that defendant was not "using
or operating" the trailer on Nebraska highways, the court avoided the
issue of whether a trailer was a motor vehicle within the purview of the
statute. The Peterson court relied on Hayes Freight Lines v. Cheatham,
277 P.2d 664 (Okla. 1954), where an Illinois corporation leased a semi-
trailer which it owned to a Kansas company licensed to do business in
Oklahoma. The Oklahoma court found that under the Oklahoma Non-
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The second issue in Peterson was whether defendant was
"doing business" within the meaning of Nebraska's Business Cor-
poration Act.41 In determining what constitutes "doing busi-
ness," the Nebraska Court has considered the facts of each
particular case, rather than following any all-embracing rule.'4
However, Nebraska does require defendant's actual physical
presence plus "the conduct of activities, more or less continuous"
within the state.43  The court concluded that U-Haul's business
activities within Nebraska and the mere presence of an occa-
sional trailer of defendant's were not sufficient contacts to meet
Nebraska's requirements for "doing business."' 4' The court
reached this conclusion despite its recognition of the benefits
which defendant derived from the success of the Rental System
in Nebraska. 4 5 The activities of an affiliated corporation doing
business within a state are not sufficient justification for the
assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident affiliate.4 0  Even if
it were shown that the various corporations were set up for the
primary purpose of escaping legal obligations, 47 it would still be
necessary to inquire whether the nonresident has the requisite
minimum contacts with the state of a particular forum.' 8 The
resident Motorist Statute, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 391 (1962), neither
the Kansas company nor its employee represented the lessor as agents
or otherwise. Accordingly, the Oklahoma court denied jurisdiction
holding that the trailer was not "used or operated" by the owner
or its agents on Oklahoma's highways.
41. Litsinger Sign Co. v. American Sign Co., 11 Ohio St. 2d 1, 227
N.E.2d 609 (1967). See note 15 supra.
42. Brown v. Globe Laboratories, Inc., 165 Neb. 138, 84 N.W.2d 151
(1957); accord, Dale Electronics, Inc. v. Copymation, Inc., 178 Neb. 239,
132 N.W.2d 788 (1965); Berg v. Midwest Laundry Equip. Corp., 175 Neb.
423, 122 N.W.2d 250 (1963).
43. 409 F.2d at 1182-83. See also Dale Electronics, Inc. v. Copy-
mation, Inc., 178 Neb. 239, 132 N.W.2d 788 (1965).
44. 409 F.2d at 1183. Cf. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958); Stewart v. Bus & Car Co., 293 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Ohio 1968);
Williams v. Connolly, 227 F. Supp. 539 (D. Minn. 1964); Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961).
45. 409 F.2d at 1184. See note 32 supra.
46. See Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333,
336 (1925); Lopinsky v. Hertz Drive-Ur-Self Systems, 194 F.2d 422
(2d Cir. 1951); Ludwig v. General Binding Corp., 21 F.R.D. 178 (E.D.
Wis. 1957); Nagl v. Northam Warren Corp., 8 F.R.D. 130 (D. Neb. 1948).
47. 409 F.2d at 1185. Cf. Darling Stores Corp. v. Young Realty Co.,
121 F.2d 112 (8th Cir. 1941); Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F.2d
478 (8th Cir. 1935). See generally Mull v. Colt Co., 178 F. Supp. 720
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
48. Velandra v. Regie Nationale des Usines Renault, 336 F.2d 292,
297 (6th Cir. 1964). The existence of dealers and a subsidiary corpora-
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Peterson court avoided this issue, however, by concluding that
the U-Haul System was not a subterfuge to escape legal lia-
bility.4
9
The final issue confronting the Peterson court was the appli-
cability of Nebraska's recently enacted long-arm statute. The
court concluded that, although the Nebraska Legislature intended
to broaden the bases for asserting jurisdiction, the statute still
required defendant's actual presence in the state plus some reg-
ular or persistent course of conduct. 0
tion doing business within the state did not constitute sufficient contact
between the parent company and the State of Michigan to permit exercise
of in personam jurisdiction over the parent corporation.
49. 409 F.2d at 1185.
50. Id. at 1183. The comment following section 1.03 of the UrN-
FORM INTERSTATE & INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE AcT (1962), which Ne-
braska adopted as its long-arm statute, states that "transacting any busi-
ness" within the meaning of section 1.03 (A) (1), (NED. REv. STAT.
§ 25-536 (1) (a) (Supp. 1967)), should be given the same interpretation as
given it by the courts of Illinois. "Transaction of business" is generally
interpreted as requiring less contact with the state than "doing busi-
ness." Steele v. DeLeeuw, 40 Misc. 2d 807, 808, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (Sup.
Ct. 1963); but Illinois still requires some physical presence by the de-
fendant or his agent. Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, 37 Ill. App. 2d 475,
480-81, 186 N.E.2d 76-79 (1962). In referring to section 1.03(a) (4),
(NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 25-536(1) (d) (Supp. 1967)), which authorizes the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction when the tortious act takes place without the state
but the injury occurs within the state, the comment interpreted the sec-
tion to be more restrictive than the Illinois statutes and Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
Arguably, the Nebraska legislature adopted this statute with the intent
of protecting the small business, nonresident defendant. This reason-
ing is not particularly persuasive since the courts can protect this de-
fendant through forum non conveniens principles. However, there may
be some ground to support a limitation on court power by limiting juris-
diction, rather than confidence in court discretion, in the notion that
leaving it all up to individual disposition of individual cases will create
too much preliminary litigation of jurisdictional issues with no guaranty
of better disposition.
The UNIFORM IwTERSTATE & INTERNATIONAL PRocEDURE AcT (1962),
has been referred to as "a conservative statement of contemporary
American thinking. " von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Ad-
judicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Hav. L. Rsv. 1121, 1152 (1966)
(emphasis added). A good commentary providing a survey of the
types of lo'ng-arm statutes available in other jurisdictions and the
theory behind and problems arising in drafting and interpreting a long-
arm statute is found in Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Nebraska: The
Need for a Long-Arm Statute, 45 NEB. L. REv. 166 (1966). Rhode Is-
land's approach to extending in personam jurisdiction to the limits of
due process is unique. Its statute provides the court with jurisdiction
as long as the nonresident has the necessary minimum contacts with
Rhode Island to satisfy federal due process requirements. ]LL GEN.
LAws ANN. § 9-5-33 (Supp. 1967). However, this approach only shifts
the burden to the courts to delineate the limits of due process. The
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The Peterson court, although sympathetic with plaintiff's
predicament, correctly interpreted the applicable Nebraska law.
The result is thus unfortunate, in that jurisdiction was pre-
cluded, not by constitutional barriers, 51 but because Nebraska
does not extend its jurisdictional arm to the limits expressed in
Supreme Court decisions.52 Although Nebraska's adoption of a
long-arm statute increases the permissible area for assertion of
in personam jurisdiction, it is still short of the constitutional
limits of due process. 53 Thus, business corporations are still en-
couraged to do business in Nebraska at the expense and incon-
venience of its own citizens who are forced to prosecute claims
against a foreign corporation in a foreign forum.
The Peterson court could have resolved the case differently
through an imaginative construction of the Nonresident Motor
Vehicle Statute-particularly in light of the trailer-liability stat-
ute. The latter statute makes the "owner of any leased ...
trailer ... jointly and severally liable with the lessee and oper-
ator thereof for ... the death of any person . . . resulting from
the operation thereof in [Nebraska]."'54 It does not seem unrea-
sonable to approach the nonresident motor vehicle statute with
the assumption that, if at all possible, it should be interpreted
so as to give practical effect to the trailer-liability statute.
It is apparent in the Peterson decision that the relative fair-
ness of the parties' interests was insufficiently emphasized. The
multistate character of defendant's activities, involving foresee-
able risk of serious harm to individuals in other states, should
be sufficient to require defendant to come to the plaintiff."5 If
Illinois and Wisconsin long-arm statutes provide examples of extend-
ing in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident to the ultimate limits of
due process. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 262.05 (Supp. 1969).
51. A foreign corporation, which performs a single act or con-
summates a single transaction can be subject to the jurisdiction of the
forum-irrespective of additional contacts with the state. See note 12
supra. The harshness of the decision is reflected by plaintiff's inability
to assert in a Nebraska court that defendant U-Haul of North Carolina
is jointly and severally liable with the driver. See NED. Rmr. STAT.
§ 39-7135 (1968).
52. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1938); McGee v. Inter-
national Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945).
53. See Id.
54. NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-7135 (1968).
55. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 50, at 1167, 1172. Cf.
Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 165 (D.
Minn. 1969) where a helicopter manufactured by a corporation with
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a corporation places its trailer in the stream of national com-
merce, it is certainly utilizing the privilege of conducting busi-
ness activities within each state into which its trailers may ulti-
mately travel. Besides direct benefits in the form of rental in-
come, U-Haul receives indirect benefits from the operation of
the Rental System in the Nebraska market, including protection
of its tradename under Nebraska law. Since Nebraska must
open its borders to such commerce, it should protect the interest
of its injured residents by providing them with a forum for
suit.56
If the Nebraska Legislature desires to extend its jurisdiction
over nonresident defendants, it must do so through better legis-
lation. One possible solution, to preclude another decision com-
parable to Peterson, would be to explicitly approve the inter-
relationship of the nonresident motor vehicle statute and the
trailer-liability statute. A broader solution is to adopt a long-
arm statute expanding the court's jurisdictional power to the
constitutional limits-relying on forum non conveniens for pro-
tection of defendants who should not be forced to litigate in
Nebraska.5 7 To provide Nebraska plaintiffs with a convenient
forum against elusive nonresident defendants, the Nebraska Leg-
islature and courts must be willing to assert in personam juris-
diction to the limits of due process or otherwise force resident
plaintiffs to seek adjudication of their claims in a foreign forum.
its sole place of business in Maryland was sold in Maryland but crashed
in Minnesota. The court refused jurisdiction under Minnesota's single
act statute, holding that under the facts of this case due process
bars in personam jurisdiction. The court applied the "foreseeable use"
test and found that although the corporation might have foreseen the
use of its helicopter in interstate commerce it could not have foreseen
substantial use in Minnesota.
56. See note 50 supra.
57. Id.
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Torts: Drug Manufacturer Held Negligent
for Failure to Use Detail Men to Warn
Physicians of Dangerous Side Effect
Appellant drug manufacturer was engaged in promoting the
sale of a new prescription drug' for the treatment of arthritis.
During the promotion it became apparent that a small hyper-
sensitive group of users suffered from deteriorating vision as a
side effect. Appellee's doctor prescribed the drug for her in
1958 and she used it daily until late 1964, at which time an
examination disclosed that her vision was rapidly deteriorating.
It was later confirmed that the drug caused her injury. Upon
learning of the side effect, appellant attempted to notify the
medical profession in three ways: 1) by inserting a warning
in the Physician's Desk Reference (PDR) ,2 2) by sending out
"product cards"3 and 3) by sending a "Dear Doctor" letter to
doctors.4 Notwithstanding these protective measures, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the lower court's finding of negligence' based
on the manufacturer's failure to instruct its "detail men" to
warn physicians about the dangerous side effect. In support of
this holding, the court added that the manufacturer's methods
of warning had not met industry custom. The court also held
that the negligence, if any, of appellee's doctor could not act as
a superseding cause to absolve the appellant of liability. Sterling
Drug, Incorporated v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969).
Prior to the emergence of manufacturers' strict liability, neg-
ligence was the major recourse available to an injured user of
1. The drug's generic name is chloroquine phosphate and its
brand name was "Aralen."
2. The PDR is a reference to about 90 percent of the drugs on the
market. It consists of information given by manufacturers and is com-
monly referred to by the physician in prescribing drugs. It is currently
an open question as to whether the PDR is subject to FDA authority
as labeling. See text accompanying notes 35-38 infra.
3. This card gives new information on a drug and is usually the
same information as that appearing in the PDR.
4. This letter suggested trimonthly eye examinations while the
patient was on the drug, but letters of this type are usually sent by bulk
mail and are therefore not given much attention by doctors.
5. Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159 (D.S.D. 1967)(court sitting without a jury).
6. A "detail man" is the salesman who contacts the doctor on behalf
of the manufacturer. He promotes the sale of drugs but differs from
the ordinary salesman to the extent that he usually has some background
in chemistry. The information that he gives doctors comes exclusively
from the manufacturer.
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a defective product. Since it was possible to manufacture de-
fective products without being negligent, this remedy proved
inadequate. Various theories of no-fault liability developed in
response and two basic premises underlie all of them. 7 The first
is that no rational reason requires the few unlucky users to
shoulder the entire burden of their injury when they were not
at fault. By shifting the risk of injuries resulting from defective
products to the manufacturer, the cost is borne by all purchasers
of that product. The second premise is that the manufacturer
should be made aware of the real cost of defective products.
The manufacturer can then allocate resources efficiently be-
tween the cost of defects in terms of litigation and the cost of
attempting to eliminate the defects. The result is likely to be a
standard of care somewhat higher than the due care standard.
Moreover, since the products will bear their true cost, products
which consumers are unwilling to buy will be eliminated.8
With judicial adoption of various theories of strict liability,
proof of negligence is no longer necessary in most product lia-
bility cases. In jurisdictions following the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, all one need prove is that: 1) the product was put into
commerce in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user, 2) the seller was engaged in the business of selling
such a product and 3) the article was expected to and did reach
the user without substantial change in the condition in which it
was sold.9
Strict liability for defective products, however, is subject
to one important exception in Restatement jurisdictions. Some
products are by their very nature "unavoidably unsafe," yet the
sale of such products is justified by their relative advantages.
The most salient example of an "unavoidably unsafe" product is
the Pasteur treatment for rabies, which very often results in
serious consequences. Marketing and administration of the vac-
cine are justified because rabies leads to a dreadful death. A
product in this category, when "properly prepared, and accom-
panied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is
it unreasonably dangerous .... -10 Therefore, the manufacturer
7. See generally McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322,
154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32
N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. R.v. 791 (1966).
8. Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and The Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
9. RESTATEmmT (SEcoND) OF ToRms § 402A (1965).
10. REsTATEmT (SEcomN) OF TORTS § 402A, comment K (1965)
(first emphasis added).
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of an "unavoidably unsafe" drug is not subject to strict liability
but is required to make reasonable efforts to warn the medical
profession of the side effects inherent in the drug."
Conventional wisdom of the pharmaceutical industry held
that since hypersensitive persons did not know of their condi-
tion, a warning about potentially dangerous side effects would
be futile. 12 Thus, a manufacturer could assert the hypersensi-
tivity of the plaintiff as a complete defense. In Sterling Drug,
Incorporated v. Cornish,13 however, the Eighth Circuit followed
the minority view 14 and held that the manufacturer had a duty
to reasonably warn plaintiff's doctor notwithstanding plaintiff's
hypersensitivity.' 5 The court said this was particularly true
where the product was a prescription drug. While the duty to
warn was not discharged by a simple change in the manufac-
turer's product card,' 6 the Cornish court did not say what type
of warning would be considered reasonable. The court found
that the defendant's "Dear Doctor" letter was not sent in time
to aid plaintiff's doctor.' 7 Thus, the question of whether a
timely letter would have discharged the manufacturer's duty to
warn was not discussed.
In Yarrow, the same court that decided Cornish was dealing
with the same drug, side effect, manufacturer and warning de-
vices. Although the "Dear Doctor" letter to Mrs. Yarrow's doc-
tor was found to be timely,' 8 the trial court also found that doc-
11. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966).
The Cornish court did not deal with the standard as it applies to "un-
avoidably unsafe" products but stated that the standard in those terms
applies generally.
12. See generally 2 L. FRUMER, PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DE-
FENSES, DAMAGES § 29 (1959), 2 R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 8.3 (1961); Keeton, Some Observations About the Strict
Liability of the Maker of Prescription Drugs: The Aftermath of MERI
29, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 149 (1968); Noel, The Duty to Warn Allergic Users
of Products, 12 VAND. L. REV. 331 (1959); Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 963 (1952).
13. 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966).
14. See Gober v. Revlon, Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1963); Wright
v. Carter Prods., 244 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1957); Braun v. Roux Distrib.
Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958).
15. 370 F.2d at 85.
16. The court reasoned that the difference between over-the-coun-
ter drugs and prescription drugs is that a doctor, in dealing with a
prescription drug, could weigh the relative value of the drug against
the seriousness of the side effect. A doctor could also look for the side
effect and possibly counteract it.
17. Plaintiff took the drug from November of 1958 to December of
1964 but the warning letter was not sent until January of 1963, and con-
sequently the damage was very likely already done.
18. The warning letter was sent in January of 1963. Mrs. Yarrow
was examined in March of 1963 and found to be normal.
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tors are inundated with mail from drug houses and consequently
do not have time to read it all. The Eighth Circuit reasoned
that since the manufacturer should have foreseen that doctors
would not read the letters, such warning failed to discharge the
manufacturer's duty to exercise reasonable care.
The Yarrow court noted that the custom of the industry was
to use the "most effective method"19 of warning the medical
profession of dangers in the use of drugs. The court noted that
doctors rely on detail men as the most effective conduit of infor-
mation from the manufacturer. The court concluded that since
the channel of communication between detail men and physi-
cians already existed, it would not have been an unreasonable
burden to have detail men, in the course of their regular calls,
personally warn doctors of newly discovered side effects.
The manufacturer argued that even if it were negligent,
the plaintiff's injury was proximately caused by the intervening
negligence of plaintiff's doctor. The court rejected this theory
solely on the basis of its previous decision in Cornish2 ° wherein
it held that no question of intervening proximate cause was
present. The Cornish court had said that if the manufacturer
failed to make reasonable efforts to warn the doctor, it was liable
"regardless of anything the doctors may or may not have done."2 1
The Yarrow court attempted to support its holding by citing
expert testimony to the effect that the industry custom is to use
the "most effective method" to warn physicians. But in fact, a
custom is "a usage or practice of the industry."2 2 It is usually
used to make objective the otherwise nebulous standard of due
care. To couch custom in evaluative terms such as 'most effec-
tive method" negates the purpose for discussing custom. More-
over, the evidence and other sources indicate that the custom
of the drug industry is to warn doctors precisely in the manner
used by the manufacturer in Yarrow.2 3 The proper way of hold-
ing the manufacturer to a standard higher than the one it had
met would have been to hold that the custom itself was unrea-
sonable.
A better method for adding support to its holding would
have been to find the manufacturer also liable on the basis of
fraud or misrepresentation.2 4 When a person makes a statement
19. 408 F.2d at 992.
20. 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966).
21. Id. at 85.
22. BLAcK's LAw DicioxARY 461 (4th ed. 1968).
23. See notes 30-36 infra.
24. These theories apparently were not argued by the plaintiff.
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and subsequently acquires new information which makes it un-
true or misleading, that person must disclose such information
to any one whom he knows is still acting on the basis of the
original statement.25 Doctors must act on information that
comes to them from manufacturers because manufacturers con-
trol nearly all drug information sources. Products come from
the manufacturer, detail men are under specific instructions from
the manufacturer, and the PDR is even published by a pharma-
ceutical manufacturing interest.26 Literally no organized, un-
biased source of drug information is available to the doctor.
The manufacturer should therefore be held to a very high stand-
ard in informing doctors of potential side effects from or defects
in drugs.
The court's blanket treatment of the intervening negligence
of plaintiff's doctor, if taken literally, would mean that even
where the doctor knows of the possibility of side effects, the man-
ufacturer could still be held liable. Such an interpretation seems
unreasonable. If the doctor's malpractice is a superseding act,
it certainly should have the potential effect of absolving the
manufacturer's liability.2 7 The problem lies in determining what
acts of the doctor supersede those of the manufacturer. A doctor
clearly should not be held liable when his error lies in justifiably
relying upon a faulty or unreasonable representation of the drug
manufacturer or for merely prescribing the drug.28 In other
situations, however, it may be convincingly argued that the doc-
tor should be held liable.29
25. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 711 (3d ed. 1964).
26. The PDR is published by Medical Economics, Inc., a subsidi-
ary of Litton Publications, Inc., a division of Litton Industries, Oradell,
New Jersey.
27. See generally C. STETLER & H. Momiz, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND
THE LAW 86-91 (4th ed. 1962); D. LOUISELL & H. WILLIAMS, TRIAL OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES § 2.12 (1960); Lindberg & Newcomer, Ad-
verse Drug Reactions, 1 TRAUMA 3 (Oct. 1959).
28. See Parker v. State, 201 Misc. 416, 105 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Ct. Cl.
1951), aff'd, 280 App. Div. 157, 112 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1952).
29. One commentator has set out five categories of negligence for
which the doctor should be held the proximate cause of the injury:
(a) Prescription of a large overdosage of the drug or other-
wise not following the manufacturer's directions;
(b) Treating a patient with an obviously adulterated or spoiled
drug, especially where its deleterious condition was due to
the doctor's acts;
(c) Prescribing a drug without first following the manufac-
turer's instructions on testing for allergic reactions or
taking a history of such reactions;
(d) Use of a drug experimentally for a condition not indicated
in the manufacturer's literature; and
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Despite the Yarrow court's oversights, its holding of no ade-
quate warning is supported by sources3° that tell of letters to
detail men from the manufacturer which contain false state-
ments as to the nature of the side effects31 and as to any Federal
Drug Administration (FDA) action taken upon the drug; 2 fur-
thermore, the general practice of manufacturers is to ignore side
effects completely or dilute the warning with reassuring phrases
such as "virtually free from side effects" or "with few significant
side effects."3 3 Reports relate that the detail man's maxim for
handling doctors is, "If you can't convince them, confuse them."3' 4
(e) Perhaps, prescription of the wrong drug.
Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Lia-
bility, 18 RuTGEsL.RPv. 947, 988-89 (1964).
30. The following excerpt appeared in THE NEv REPuBac and
was also read into the Congressional Record:
The William S. Merrill Co. (a division of Richardson-Merrill)
whose anti-cholestral drug MER/29 was ultimately taken off
the market because of side-effects that included liver damage,
hair loss, hepatitis and cataracts, promoted MER/29 with elab-
orate patter manuals asking detail men to assure doctors that
the drug worked, was safe, and should be prescribed. Sales-
men were told, in sentences puncutated with multiple exclama-
tion marks, to memorize a pitch and know it well enough that
it could not be seen through as "canned." They were instructed
to affect excitement ("You owe it to yourself-to your company-
to the millions of people who need MER/29, to be enthusi-
astic!! 1") and told how to deliver the line ("Lean forward-
toward the doctor. Automatically tighten your stomach
muscles as you make your presentation. This forces a change
in the inflection of your voice and paves the way for deeper
penetration of the benefits you are describing.") Finally, he
detail men were told how to shift any doctor's suspicions about
a Merrill drug to medicine made by other firms ("Even if you
know your drug can cause the side-effect mentioned, chances
are equally good the same effect is being caused by the second
drug. You let your drug take the blame when you counter
with a defensive answer. Know how to answer side-effects
honestly, yes, but get the facts first. Doctor, what other drugs
is the patient taking? Been doing it for years? Why didn't
you tell us then?") This line supposedly got the clottish
physician to attribute undesirable side-effects to Upjohn or
Lilly. The tactic was rationalized because, rhetoric aside, the
cause was good: "There is no longer any valid question as to
its (MERI29) safety or lack of significant side-effects."
Sanford, Drug Peddlers, Tan NEW REPu ic 16-17 (Sept 21, 1968),
quoted in 114 CONG. REc. 12710-711 (daily ed. Oct 12, 1968). For a com-
prehensive treatment of drug industry practices, see M. MLn;, THE Tam-
APEu c NIGHTMARE (1965); R. HARms, Tan REAL VoicE (1964). See
also Ruge, Regulation of Prescription Drug Advertising: Medical Pro-
gress and Private Enterprise, 32 LAw & CONTED. PROB. 650 (1967).
31. S. REP. No. 448, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 194-95 (1961) (an interim
report of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Antitrust
and Monopoly of value) [hereinafter cited as Kefauver Report].
32. Id.
33. Id. at 198-99. Many more examples of statements used by the
industry to dilute warnings appear at this citation.
34. Id. at 191.
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Doctors not only rely heavily 35 upon detail men but in many
cases such representatives are the physician's sole source of drug
information.36 It is ironic then, that the authority of the FDA is
limited to "labeling" and "advertising" neither of which has been
extended to include oral communications. The original version
of the 1962 amendment 37 to the 1938 Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act 38 would have included oral clauses as advertising
but that provision was not enacted. If Yarrow is read to hold
that detail men must warn doctors orally, it represents a judicial
attempt to fill the gap left by Congress. The result is highly
desirable in view of the apparent practice of the industry but
one must not consider it a panacea. Problems of proof will
arise as with all oral statements subject to litigation. Moreover,
detail men in actuality may not be a very effective method of
warning due to their self interest in selling drugs.
A better reading of Yarrow is that the use of detail men is
only one possible method of warning. The duty to warn might
be discharged in various other ways depending upon the severity
of the side effect. The manufacturer could send out the same
warning devices but use registered mail. It could call the doc-
tor's attention to the warning by indicating such on the en-
velope, thus distinguishing the warning mail from the ordinary
promotional mail. Assuming the warning letter was adequate,
these techniques would tend to shift the duty to the doctor to
read and heed the warning.
Notwithstanding the court's unclear treatment of industry
custom and malpractice on intervening proximate cause, the
value of Yarrow as precedent is that the drug industry in the
future must make a more concerted effort to warn where the
side effect is serious. But since the detail man's face-to-face
contact with doctors is extremely important to the manufac-
turer's promotion of new drugs, the drug industry will probably
interpret the case as proposing detail men as only one method
of warning. Considering the detail man's practice of misleading
doctors, plaintiffs' lawyers would do well to emphasize discovery
with a view to presenting their case under a fraud or misrepre-
sentation theory. Decisions under these theories would have a
35. 114 Cong. Rec. 12711 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1968); Kefauver Report,
supra note 31, at 155-56, 190.
36. Kefauver Report, supra note 31, at 190.
37. S. REP. No. 1552, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(A) (7) (1961).
38. 52 Stat. 1040 (1938), as amended, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1964,
Supp. II, 1965-66).
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more direct effect on what detail men say than will the Yarrow
approach. The remaining questions are what warning tech-
niques will satisfy the duty to warn and if detail men must
warn, when must they warn and what must they say.
Torts: Invasion of Privacy-Disclosure of Contents
of Wrongfully Obtained Documents of Public Figure1
In June and July of 1965, four persons, employees and
former employees of United States Senator Thomas J. Dodd,
entered the Senator's private offices secretly at night and re-
moved from the files thousands of documents of a highly com-
promising character. The documents were photocopied and re-
turned in secret to the Senator's offices before their removal
was discovered. The copies thus obtained were given to Jack
Anderson, the associate of the late Drew Pearson, co-author of the
muckraking Washington Merry-Go-Round column, which ap-
peared in the Washington Post and 600 other newspapers. Based
on this information, a series of about two dozen columns were
devoted to Senator Dodd beginning in the winter of 1966. These
columns charged, among other things, that Dodd was under the
corrupt influence of a lobbiest, that he had diverted money
raised for his political campaigns into his personal treasury and
that he had accepted money from businessmen in return for pre-
ferring their interests in the government. Senator Dodd brought
an action against Pearson and Anderson on theories of defama-
tion, conversion and invasion of privacy.
Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the defamation
theory. The district court, per Judge Holtzoff, ruled2 that the
case was incapable of a summary disposition of a libel theory be-
cause a public official could prevail in a defamation action
only on showing defendant's actual malice, which in the court's
view, was a jury question.3 Plaintiff then discharged the libel
allegation from his complaint and moved for a partial summary
judgment on the issues of conversion and invasion of privacy."
Judge Holtzoff denied the motion on the invasion of privacy
claim, and dismissed that matter from the action on the ground
1. See Comment, 21 SYR. L. REv. 365 (1969).
2. Dodd v. Pearson, 277 F. Supp. 469 (D.D.C. 1967).
3. The presence of a defamation count in the complaint was al-
most frivolous. Since New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964),
it is well established that a public official may not obtain a recovery
for defamatory words unless they have been uttered with "actual mal-
ice," i.e., were knowingly false or were uttered with a reckless disregard
for their truth or falsity. Senator Dodd's complaint, moreover, would
have been defeated even by traditional common law defenses to libel,
since it was nowhere denied that the statements published by Pearson
were true, and truth would generally be a complete defense to an action
of defamation.
4. Dodd v. Pearson, 279 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1968).
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that there was a substantial public interest in the publication of
the incriminating documents. But he granted the partial sum-
mary judgment on the matter of liability for conversion, ex-
pressing dubiety about the probable monetary value of the re-
covery. Defendant appealed the judgment. In Pearson v.
Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, per Judge J.
Skelly Wright, affirmed the district court's dismissal of the in-
vasion of privacy theory, and reversed the lower court's judg-
ment with respect to the conversion.
Invasion of privacy is a relatively new cause of action in tort.
Its origin is generally traced to the article The Right of Privacy
by Warren and Brandeis.5 Although this tort grew slowly, the
interest that it protected could generally be vindicated on other
theories. During the past 20 years, the "right of privacy" has
enjoyed a precipitous bull market. Dean Prosser, whose scholar-
ship everywhere pervades the cases, has detailed four major
"branches" of this action: intrusion, public disclosure of private
facts, false light in the public eye and appropriation.0 It is with
the first two branches that this Comment is concerned.
In most jurisdictions there is a recognized right to be free
from the unjustified intrusions of others.7 Originally, only
5. 4 HRv. L. REv. 193 (1890). Judge Cooley made mention of a
"right to be let alone" even earlier. T. COOLEY, ToRrs 29 (2d ed. 1889).
6. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAMap. L. REv. 383 (1960).
7. There is, of course, no ancient common law right of privacy.
In re Hart's Estate, 193 Misc. 854, 83 N.Y.S.2d 653 (1948). But to one
extent or-another, some sort of "right to be let alone" has been recog-
nized by almost all jurisdictions. Alabama, Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250,
37 So. 2d 118 (1948); Arizona, Reed v. Real Detective PubL Co., 63 Ariz.
294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); Arkansas, Olin Mills v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495,
353 S.W.2d 22 (1962); Delaware, Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189
A-2d 773 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Florida, Harms v. Miami Daily News, Inc.,
127 So. 2d 715 (Ct. App. 1961); Georgia, Walker v. Whittle, 83 Ga. App.
445, 64 S.E.2d 87 (1951); Hawaii, Ferergstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean
View Estates, 441 P.2d 141 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Idaho, Peterson v. Idaho
First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961); Indiana, State
ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 (1946); Illinois,
Eick v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 IM. App. 293, 106 N.E.2d 742 (Ct. App.
1952); Iowa, Bremmer v. Journal Tribune Publ Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76
N.W.2d 762 (1956); Kansas, Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan.
275, 262 P.2d 808 (1953); Kentucky, Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., 295
Ky. 345, 174 S.W.2d 510 (1943); Missouri, Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo.
1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942); New Jersey, McGovern v. Van Riper, 137
N.J. Eq. 24, 43 A.2d 514 (1945), affd, 137 N.J. Eq. 548, 45 A.2d 842
(1946); Ohio, Friedman v. Cincinnati Local Joint Executive Bd., 6
Ohio Supp. 276, rev'd on other grounds, 86 Ohio App. 189, 90 N.E.2d
447 (1941); Oregon, Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.
2d 438 (1941); Pennsylvania, In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679
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physical intrusions were recognized as redressable, suggesting
the equal applicability of conventional trespass doctrines.8 It
is now plain, however, that the ambit of this branch of the
tort is much wider. Intrusion by wiretap, by overly zealous
trailing and by electronic eavesdropping apparatus have been
redressed by various courts.9
To maintain an action for intrusion, no publication of any
information obtained by unjustified intrusion is necessary to per-
fect the wrong.10 Neither publication nor intent to publish
need be alleged or proved; all that is required is that there be an
intrusion into plaintiff's solitude or seclusion and that the in-
trusion be unjustified.1 1 "It is clear that there must be some-
thing in the nature of prying or intrusion. . . . It is also clear
that the thing into which there is prying or intrusion must be,
and is entitled to be private.' 1
2
The second Prosserian category is "public disclosure of pri-
vate facts." 3 Three components make up this branch of the
privacy action: first, private facts must be publicly disclosed;
second, the facts disclosed must be private, and not public
facts;1 4 and third, the facts disclosed must be such as would
be offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities.1 5 Dean Pros-
ser argues that the public disclosure branch protects the interest
(1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957); South Carolina, Holloman v.
Life Insurance Co. of Virginia, 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E.2d 169 (1940);
South Dakota, Truxes v. Kenco Enterprises, Inc., 80 S.D. 104, 119 N.W.2d
914 (1963).
In addition, New York and Wisconsin have recognized the right of
privacy by statute, pre-empting judicial law making on the subject.
No recent court has been found to say that there is no real interest in
privacy worthy of judicial protection absent statutory decree.
8. See, e.g., De May v. Roberts, 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 (1881).
9. Roach v. Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958) (bugging
a dwelling): Fowler v. S. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150
(5th Cir. 1965); LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129,
201 N.E.2d 533 (1963) (bugging telephones). The leading case in the
field of electronic eavesdropping is Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107,
206 A.2d 239 (1964). Defendant landlord had concealed a microphone
in the bedroom of the dwelling he had leased to plaintiffs. When they
discovered it, they brought suit on the "intrusion theory" and recov-
ered. Chief Justice Kennison, for a unanimous Supreme Court, ruled
that defendant's act was an invasion of plaintiffs' solitude or seclusion
and "was a violation of their right of privacy and constituted a tort."
10. Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964);
Fowler v. S. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 343 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1965).
11. Id.
12. Prosser, supra note 6, at 390-91.
13. Id. at 393.
14. Id. at 394.
15. Id. at 396.
[Vol. 55:156
CASE COMMENTS
in reputation "with the same overtones of distress that are pres-
ent in libel and slander"'16 except that here there is no defense
of truth.
In contrast to the action for invasion of privacy, the action
for conversion is a venerable institution in the common law.
Possibly more than any other civil wrong, conversion has been
elusive of definition. "[A]fter all," said Baron Bramwell, "no
one can undertake to define what a conversion is."17 The name
of the wrong comes from "the classic count in trover"' 8 which
"alleges that the plaintiff was possessed, as of his own property,
of a certain chattel; that he afterwards casually lost it; that it
came to the possession of the defendant by finding; that the de-
fendant refused to deliver it to the plaintiff on request; and that
he converted it to his own use, to the plaintiff's damage."
1 9
The sort of property which might be made subject to an action
for conversion was originally governed by the fiction of losing
and finding,20 so that, at first, only "tangible property" could
properly be the subject of the action. This is clearly no longer
the law2 ' since stocks, bonds, checks, notes and bills of ex-
change, insurance policies22 and even judgments2 3 have been
held capable of being converted.
Dean Prosser has defined the nature of conversion thus:
"Conversion is an intentional exercise of dominion or control
over a chattel, which so seriously interferes with the right of
another to control it that the actor may justly be required to
16. Id. at 398. Prof. Bloustein differs with this analysis of the na-
ture of the interest protected. Bloustein suggests that the true gravamen
of the action is not the "reputation" interest, but rather the interest in
human dignity and individuality, to which the public disclosure is an
affront. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity, An Answer
to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 981 (1964).
17. Burroughs v. Bayne, 5 H. & N. 296 (Exch. 1860).
18. Ames, The History of Trover, 11 HARv. L. REv. 277 (1897).
19. Id.
20. W. PROSSER, LAw OF ToRTs § 15 (3d ed. 1964).
21. Comment, Conversion of Choses in Action, 10 ForD. L. REv.
415 (1941).
22. Id. at 419, 422.
23. Id. at 423. In Rivinus v. Langford, 75 F. 959 (2d Cir. 1896):
One partner without authority settled a judgment with the
debtor for less than the full amount and executed a satisfaction
piece. The other partner recovered from the offending partner
the difference between the full amount of the judgment and the
amount of the settlement. This decision is to be noted espe-
cially since it recognized the conversion of an intangible right
where no unlawful dominion was exercised over tangible evi-
dence.
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pay the other the full value of the chattel. '24 Prefaced to this
excursion, which later was incorporated by the Second Restate-
ment of Torts, was this caveat:
[Tihere is probably no type of act or conduct on the part of a
defendant which is always, under any and all circumstances,
a conversion; ... as to any particular type of act the existence
of this tort is a matter of the seriousness of the interference
with the plaintiff's rights, which in turn will depend upon the
interplay of a number of different factors, each of which has
its own importance, and may, in a proper case, be controlling. 25
The different factors enumerated were: "(a) the extent and
duration of the actor's exercise of dominion or control; (b)
the actor's intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with
the other's right of control; (c) the actor's good faith; (d)
the extent and duration of the resulting interference with the
other's right of control; (e) the harm done to the chattel; (f) the
expense and inconvenience caused to the other. ' 26 It is appar-
ent that the discretion of the courts operates in these cases to
determine whether, on a given state of facts, the action will lie;
and because the various factors to be considered are numerous,
and all but imponderable, it appears that the conversion area is
one where the discretion of the court has the widest possible
play. In all but the plainest of cases, it would seem that a
court could properly reach the conclusion that the ingredient
factors of conversion were not present in the proper proportions,
and that the lesser wrong of trespass to chattels would more
properly lie. The fact of this uncertainty has been betimes the
occasion of scholastic sulking.2 7 Nevertheless, the property of
aetherial unpredictability is a fixture of the law of conversion.
In the district court conversion and invasion of privacy were
pleaded as alternative theories of recovery. This argument rests
on the assumption that plaintiff's possessory rights in the docu-
ments abstracted from his office were substantially enough in-
terfered with to support an action for conversion. Judge Wright
found that the intermeddling was insufficient to amount to a
conversion and reversed the judgment of Judge Holtzoff on that
issue.28  The difference in the holdings of the district and ap-
24. Prosser, The Nature of Conversion, 42 ConN. L.Q. 168, 173-74
(1957).
25. Id. at 173.
26. Id. at 174.
27. "Surely such a serious liability as that of the defendant in
trover ought not to depend upon such an uncertain test." Clark, The
Test of Conversion, 21 HARv. L. REv. 408, 414 (1908).
28. "[N]ot every wrongful interference with the personal property
of another is a conversion. Where the intermeddling falls short of
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pellate courts may be explained simply as a divergence of opin-
ion as to whether receipt of the purloined information was "a
substantial enough interference" with property to amount to a
conversion, rather than simply a trespass to chattels.
In this connection it might properly be noted that "pos-
sessory" rights are not the only species of rights which will sup-
port an action for conversion; 29 thus, Judge Wright's having de-
termined that plaintiff's possessory rights were insufficiently dis-
turbed does not dispose of the conversion issue. There may be
some non-tangible right in the documents which will ground
the action for conversion. Plaintiff might have argued that the
interest in privacy-which is a non-possessory interest-could
stand in the place of possession. But this argument would de-
mand that invasion of privacy be seen as a reciprocal, rather than
as an alternative theory of recovery. Judge Holtzoff noted:
"[T]he publication of the material of which the plaintiff com-
plains is not protected by the cloak of the right of privacy, be-
cause the publications relate to his activities as a high-ranking
public officer, namely, Senator of the United States, in which
the public had an interest."30 Apparently, the "public disclosure"
branch was what Judge Holtzoff had in mind; but it is not at
all clear from the several opinions in the case that the "intrusion"
interest might not have been enough upon which to predicate
a recovery for conversion.
Judge Wright underscored the possibility that the two
branches might be differently treated when he stated that the
damage said to inhere in the publication must be strictly dis-
tinguished from the damage said to inhere in the intrusion.3 1
As to the former, the New York Times rule -3 2 apparently applies
to prevent a public official from recovering absent a showing of
actual malice. As to the intrusion itself, the logical rule would
be to hold liable the intruders, and anyone connected with them
by ordinary rules of privity or agency, but to draw the line of
liability at third persons unconnected with the intrusion. The
court of appeals stated this rule33 but immediately drew its
the complete or very substantial deprivation of possessory rights in the
property, the tort committed is not conversion, but the lesser wrong of
trespass to chattels." 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
29. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
30. 279 F. Supp. 101, 105 (D.D.C. 1968).
31. 410 F.2d at 705-06.
32. See note 3 supra.
33. 410 F.2d at 705-06.
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meaning into question by stating curtly that Pearson and Ander-
son were not connected with the intrusion itself, but only with
the publication, an act protected by a constitutional rule.8" The
liability for intrusion reflects a dignitary value which goes to the
manner of acquiring information.3" The intruder may well be
privileged to publish information improperly gained without lia-
bility for the publication, but still be liable for the intrusion itself.
It would, for example, be intolerable to frame a rule of law which
permitted Jack Anderson to read the contents of anyone's files or
private papers on the off-chance that some marketable scandal
would show up. But that was not the situation in Dodd. In
Dodd, the intruders knew exactly what they were looking for
in their victim's files. They had seen most of the documents be-
fore and knew of certain others. Undoubtedly they could testify
as to what they knew of their former employer's cupidity with-
out liability of any sort attaching. It might be argued, there-
fore, that a privilege exists for them to collect data to corroborate
their memories. In Lopez v. United States,3 6 an Internal Reve-
nue agent, wired for sound, recorded the defendant's bribe of-
fers on a machine. Defendant argued that the recording ought
not to be permitted into evidence. The Supreme Court rejected
this argument. For the majority, Mr. Justice Harlan wrote,
Stripped to its essentials, petitioner's argument amounts to say-
34. James Boyd, the ringleader of the intruders, writes in his mem-
oire of the affair of going to see Jack Anderson and telling a tale of
corruption, veniality and knavery on the part of Dodd. Anderson is
quoted as saying, "If we can substantiate half of this, it will be the most
significant disclosure of corruption in Washington in forty years ... "
J. BOYD, ABOVE THE LAW 115 (1968). Boyd then states, "A working re-
lationship was thus begun." Id. Several forays were made into Dodd's
files during the ensuing weeks; the products of the forays were re-
moved from the Senate Office Building to an office several miles up-
town where they were photocopied by Opal Ginn, Jack Anderson's sec-
retary. When Boyd and a co-conspirator arrived at the uptown ad-
dress to begin the job of photocopying, "Opal Ginn was waiting, cool
with conspiratorial aplomb." Id. at 125. In Boyd's opinion at least, de-
fendants and intruders were indeed bound together. If they were
bound together, it follows that there would be liability for intrusion in
the defendants unless some privilege could be found to intercept that
liability.
35. An analogy might be drawn to the law protecting trade se-
crets. There is no rule preventing one company from acquiring into. •
mation kept secret by a competitor, so long as a tolerable tactic is
undertaken to acquire it. Reverse engineering, for example, is per-
fectly acceptable. But bribing an insider or taking the sought-for
information by burglary will not be permitted. See E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours Powder Co., 244 U.S. 100 (1917) (opinion of Holmes, J.); Morn-
son v. Moat, 9 Hare 241, 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (1851).
36. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
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ing that he has a constitutional right to rely on possible flaws in
the agent's memory, or to challenge the agent's credibility with-
out being beset by corroborating evidence that is not susceptible
of impeachment .... We thing the risk that the petitioner took
in offering a bribe ... fairly included the risk that the offer
would be accurately reproduced in court. .... 37
Perhaps an analogous argument could be made in Dodd. The
intrusion liability is a dignitary matter; but that point should not
detain us, for among these intruders, Dodd had no figleaf to cover
his shame. These intruders already knew of the documents which
they sought. Since they already had information, there should
be no objection to their obtaining precise information.
It might, of course, be argued that, after all, one who places
a microphone in a marital bedroom, like the landlord in the
Hamberger38 case, is not apt to "find out" anything he did not
generally suspect before. It may therefore be necessary to find
a general justification for the act of intrusion grounded in an
overmastering public policy. In the Dodd case, that justifica-
tion could be found in the Code of Ethics for Government
Service3 9 : "Any person in government service should: . . . (IX)
expose corruption wherever discovered." As a general rule,
that duty would confer a privilege to inform the proper persons
of the alleged corruption. In the case of suspected corruption
in a low-ranking employee, the privilege might extend no further
than advising the employee's supervisor. Clearly, a privilege of
different scope should attach to the alleged corruption of a
United States Senator.
40
Plaintiff might plausibly have argued the existence of a
right in his files analagous to the comnon-law right of a
writer of a letter to the first publication thereof. The fact that
such an argument seems not to have been made is consistent
37. Id. at 439.
38. Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 207 A.2d 239 (1964). See
note 9 supra.
39. House Doc. No. 103, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1958).
40. Boyd justified his actions on this very theory.
To whom do you go to get a United States Senator investigated?
... I doubted that we could go to the F.B.L or to its parent,
the Justice Department, with any more assurance than we could
go to the Senate .... A United States Senator was regarded
as an ambassador from a state, an independent sovereign among
his peers, . . . a maker of laws and a selector of judges. The
Constitution itself protected him from certain kinds of inter-
ference and arrest. About him had been spawned an under-
growth of official attitudes and immunities which rendered him
all but above the law. Only public opinion, we judged, had the
power to cut through this web .... Drew Pearson and Jack
Anderson came immediately to mind.
J. BoYD, ABOVE THE LAw 111 (1968).
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with plaintiff's theory that the conversion and privacy wrongs
were alternative rather than reciprocal, since plaintiff, one
supposes, took the physical interference with his documents to
be self-evidently determinative of the conversion issue. Judge
Wright suggested, however, that even if the common-law copy-
right argument had been made, it would not have changed the
result in his court. The court stated that the law has developed
a norm of no-protection for the taking of mere ideas. An excep-
tion is made for certain ideas, their diacritical feature being that
protectable ideas may be instruments "of fair and effective com-
mercial competition."' ' - None of plaintiff's papers falls into that
category as far as can be seen. "Insofar as we can tell," added
Judge Wright, "none of [Dodd's papers] amounts to literary
property. 4 2 In this, Judge Wright was altogether mistaken.
He retrogresses to a much earlier time in the law when judges
arrogated to themselves the decision as to what was literature
and what was not. Dodd's files are, by the standards of most
modern courts, "literary property," inasmuch as courts will never
(with apparently a few exceptions) decide what is literature
and what is not.4 3 It is unfortunate that Judge Wright chose not
to confront the "literary property" difficulty directly, inasmuch
as it provided an opportunity to articulate a logical extension
of the New York Times doctrine, to wit, that the law of copy-
right or literary property may not be invoked to sequester in-
formation which otherwise could be published by a person with-
out fear of liability for defamation or invasion of privacy. Al-
though that rule seems never to have been announced by any
court, it is in principle sound in light of the developing constitu-
tional jurisprudence in the area and in light of the dictates of a
fair public policy. Although plaintiff did not raise this issue
for argument, the court of appeals did, and it was remiss in
failing to bring it to a craftsmanlike resolution. 4
4
Dodd presented a curious set of facts which is apt to arise
seldom, if ever, again. The peculiar mix of an alleged series of
great wrongs, attributed to a person who is a public official,
squarely within the New York Times rule, and an intruder who
is under no duty not to reveal the official's wrongdoing,"' and
41. 410 F.2d at 708.
42. Id.
43. See Note, 44 IowA L. REv. 705, 708-09 (1959).
44. See 410 F.2d at 706 n.23.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395, comment f (1958),
states that an agent is under no obligation to keep secret the confidential
matters of his principal if such secrecy would cloak wrongdoing.
[Vol. 55:156
CASE COMMENTS
who may well have an affirmative legal duty to reveal it, poses
one of the least sympathetic cases imaginable for the upholding
of a right to be free from intrusion-the right to be let alone.
The rule in Dodd, stated in its narrowest sense, is that one who
intrudes upon the private files of a United States Senator will
not by his intrusion transmit liability to a non-participating
donee-beneficiary of his foray, even where the beneficiary was
aware of the manner in which the material was obtained. It
is not at all clear that if the victim were someone other than
a United States Senator, or if the intruder had no colorable
privilege of intrusion, or even if the alleged justification for the
intrusion were any less than that in Dodd, that the no-liability
result should necessarily obtain. Indeed, there is more than a
speculative interest in clarifying this point. The intrusion for-
mat which appeared in Dodd was employed on at least one other
occasion by the same defendants. In Liberty Lobby v. Pear-
son,4 6 a hireling of Jack Anderson infiltrated the staff of Liberty
Lobby, Inc., an organization which propagandizes right wing po-
litical ideas. The hireling copied certain documents from the or-
ganization's files and forwarded the copies to defendants who
prepared expos6 columns of the usual sort. Prior to publica-
tion, Liberty Lobby discovered the leak and sought an injunc-
tion forbidding the publication of the columns. The district
court, per Judge Holtzoff, denied the injunction on a prior-re-
straint rationale, relying on Near v. Minnesota.47 Near ap-
parently has been taken as a constitutional mandate that pub-
lications shall not be subject to previous restraint, irrespective
of what cause of action may arise on account of their publica-
tion. While it could be limited to its particular facts and con-
fined to instances where the state sought a criminal prosecution
for words, 48 it is almost certain that Near would everywhere be
taken as controlling the Liberty Lobby situation.
After the Pearson column blasting the operation of Liberty
Lobby was published, it does not appear that the organization
took further action against Pearson. As a matter of logic, it
does not seem that if a further remedy had been sought, a rule
like the one in Dodd would have been appropriate. Even if it
had been held that the privacy right of a corporation were sub-
ject to less consideration than that of a natural person, and re-
46. 261 F. Supp. 726 (D.D.C. 1966).
47. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
48.. See Note, Vindication of Reputation of a Public Official, 80
HARv. L. REv. 1730, 1738 (1967).
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covery had been denied on that ground, it is plain that the
public interest in the machinations of a private propaganda mill
is not of the same magnitude or character as that attaching to
the alleged corruption of a United States Senator. Further, it is
not at all clear that public policy confers a privilege on Jack
Anderson's deputies to purloin every scabrous tidbit they can
find.
A special problem is raised when the intruder is a public
agency and the victim of the intrusion is apparently a private
man. This is the fourth amendment difficulty adverted to in the
concurring opinion of Judge Tamm.49  He points out that it
is illogical that public authorities should be constrained in their
perusal of private documents by the strictures of the fourth
amendment while private journalists, who compulsively wrap
themselves in the sanctimonious flag of "the public interest,"
are constitutionally free to seize such documents as they will.
It is not at all clear, as has been argued, that private journalists
are as free as the Dodd opinion might at first seem to suggest;
but nevertheless, there are manifestly significant differences, in
terms of eventual consequences, between the seizure of docu-
ments by Jack Anderson on the one hand, and a Department of
Justice prosecutor on the other. The resources and power of
government furnish a fertile ground for an everlasting malig-
nity which no single private entrepreneur could hope to match.
This fact alone would justify the logic of declining to apply the
fourth amendment to private journalists.
Invasion of privacy has grown from a faux pas to a tort, and
from a tort to an industry.5 1 It is entirely possible that ad-
vances in the technology of snooping will require of the law
rules of absolute inflexibility which would make the slightest in-
vasion of privacy, however defined, subject to strict penalty, ir-
respective of any supposed justification. Apparently, we have
not reached that point yet; if we are lucky, we never will. The
courts must be astute to consider cases pertingent to the privacy
interest with a more-than-routine care. To apply the rule in
Dodd with an uncritical latitude could lead from the troubling
situation to the intolerable.
49. 410 F.2d at 708.
50. There is a second and more obvious response to Judge Tamm's
reservations: historically, the amendments to the Constitution have ap-
plied to limit the prerogatives of federal or state government. Their
application has never extended prohibitively to private men.
51. See, e.g., S. DAsH, R. ScHwArz & R. KNOWLTON, THE EAVES-
DROPPERS (1959).
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